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Multi-algorithmic Cryptography using Deterministic
Chaos with Applications to Mobile Communications
Jonathan M Blackledge, Fellow, IET, Fellow, BCS, Fellow, IMA, Fellow, RSS
Abstract— In this extended paper, we present an overview
of the principal issues associated with cryptography, providing
historically significant examples for illustrative purposes as part
of a short tutorial for readers that are not familiar with the
subject matter. This is used to introduce the role that nonlinear
dynamics and chaos play in the design of encryption engines
which utilize different types of Iteration Function Systems (IFS).
The design of such encryption engines requires that they conform
to the principles associated with diffusion and confusion for
generating ciphers that are of a maximum entropy type. For
this reason, the role of confusion and diffusion in cryptography is
discussed giving a design guide to the construction of ciphers that
are based on the use of IFS. We then present the background and
operating framework associated with a new product - CrypsticTM
- which is based on the application of multi-algorithmic IFS to
design encryption engines mounted on a USB memory stick using
both disinformation and obfuscation to ‘hide’ a forensically inert
application. The protocols and procedures associated with the use
of this product are also briefly discussed.
Index Terms— Cryptography, Nonlinear Dynamics, Iteration
Function Systems, Chaos, Multi-algorithmicity
I. INTRODUCTION
THE quest for inventing innovative techniques which onlyallow authorized users to transfer information that is
impervious to attack by others has, and continues to be, an
essential requirement in the communications industry (e.g.
[1], [2], [3]). This requirement is based on the importance
of keeping certain information secure, obvious examples being
military communications and financial transactions, the former
example, being a common theme in the history and develop-
ment of Cryptology [4], [5], [6].
Cryptography is the study of mathematical and computa-
tional techniques related to aspects of information security
(e.g. [7]-[9]). The word is derived from the Greek Kryp-
tos, meaning hidden, and is related to disciplines such as
Cryptanalysis and Cryptology. Cryptanalysis is the art of
breaking cryptosystems by developing techniques for the re-
trieval of information from encrypted data without having a
priori knowledge of the required decryption process (typically,
knowledge of the key) [10]. Cryptology is the science that
underpins Cryptography and Cryptanalysis and can include
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a broad range of mathematical concepts, computational al-
gorithms and technologies. In other words, Cryptology is
a multi-disciplinary subject that covers a wide spectrum of
different disciplines and increasingly involves using a range of
engineering concepts and technologies through the innovation
associated with term ‘technology transfer’. These include areas
such as Synergetics, which is an interdisciplinary science
explaining the formation and self-organization of patterns and
structures in non-equilibrium open systems and Semiotics,
which is the study of both individual and grouped signs and
symbols, including the study of how meaning is constructed
and understood [11].
Cryptology is often concerned with the application of
formal mathematical techniques to design a cryptosystem
and to estimate its theoretical security. This can include the
use of formal methods for the design of security software
which should ideally be a ‘safety critical’ [12]. However,
although the mathematically defined and provable strength
of a cryptographic algorithm or cryptosystem is necessary,
it is not a sufficient requirement for a system to be accept-
ably secure. This is because it is difficult to estimate the
security of a cryptosystem in any formal sense when it is
implemented under operational conditions that cannot always
be predicted and thus, simulated. The security associated with
a cryptosystem can be checked only by means of proving its
resistance to various kinds of known attack that are likely
to be implemented. However, in practice, this does not mean
that the system is secure since other attacks may exist that
are not included in simulated or test conditions. The reason
for this is that humans possess a broad range of abilities from
unbelievable ineptitude to astonishing brilliance which can not
be formalized in a mathematical sense or on a case by case
basis.
The practical realities associated with Cryptology are in-
dicative of the fact that ‘security is a process, not a product’
[13]. Whatever the sophistication of the security product
(e.g. the encryption and/or key exchange algorithm(s), for
example), unless the user adheres strictly to the procedures
and protocols designed for its use the ‘product’ can be severely
compromised. A good example of this is the use of the Enigma
[14] cipher by Germany during the Second World War. It was
not just the ‘intelligence’ of the ‘code breakers’ at Bletchley
Park in England that allowed the allies to break many of the
Enigma codes but the ‘irresponsibility’ and, in many cases,
the sheer stupidity of the way in which the system was used
by the German armed and intelligence services at the time.
The basic mechanism for the Enigma cipher, which had
been developed as early as 1923 by Artur Schubius for se-
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curing financial transactions, was well known to the allies due
primarily to the efforts of the Polish Cipher Office at Poznan in
the 1930s. The distribution of some 10,000 similar machines to
the German army, navy and air force was therefore a ‘problem
waiting to happen’. The solution would have been to design
a brand new encryption engine or better still, a range of
different encryption engines given the technology of the time,
and use the Enigma machine to propagate disinformation.
Indeed, some of the new encryption engines introduced by
the Germans towards the end of the Second World War were
not broken by the allies.
These historically intriguing insights are easy to contem-
plate in hindsight, but they can also help to focus on the
methodologies associated with developing new technologies
for knowledge management which is a focus of the material
considered in this work. Here, we explore the use of deter-
ministic chaos for designing ciphers that are composed of
many different pseudo chaotic number generating algorithms
- Meta-encryption-engines. This multi-algorithmic or Meta-
engine approach provides a way of designing an unlimited
class of encryption engines as opposed to designing a single
encryption engine that is operated by changing the key(s)
- which for some systems, public key system in particular,
involves the use of prime numbers. There are of course a
number of disadvantages to this approach which are discussed
later on but it is worth stating at this point, that the principal
purpose for exploring the application of deterministic chaos in
cryptography is:
• the non-reliance of such systems on the use of prime
numbers which place certain limits on the characteristics
and arithmetic associated with an encryption algorithm;
• the potentially unlimited number of chaos based algo-
rithms that can be, quite literally, invented to produce a
meta-encryption engine.
II. INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
With regard to information security and the management
of information in general, there are some basic concepts that
are easy to grasp and sometimes tend to get lost in the detail.
The first of these is that the recipient of any encrypted message
must have some form of a priori knowledge on the method (the
algorithm, for example) and the operational conditions (e.g.
the key) used to encrypt a message. Otherwise, the recipient
is in no better ‘state of preparation’ than the potential attacker.
The conventional approach is to keep this a priori information
to a minimum but in such a way that it is critical to the
decryption process. Another important reality is that in an
attack, if the information transmitted is not deciphered in good
time, then it may become redundant. Coupled with the fact
that an attack usually has to focus on a particular criterion
(such as a specific algorithm), one way to enhance the security
of a communications channel is to continually change the
encryption algorithm and/or process offered by the technology
available.
Another approach to information management is to disguise
or camouflage the encrypted message in what would appear
to be ‘innocent’ or ‘insignificant’ data such as a digital
photograph, a music file or both, for example1. This is known
as Steganography [15]-[17]. Further, the information security
products themselves should be introduced and ‘organised’
in such a way as to reflect their apparent insignificance in
terms of both public awareness and financial reward which
helps to combat the growing ability to ‘hack and crack’ using
increasingly sophisticated software that is readily available,
e.g. [18]. This is of course contrary to the dissemination
of many encryption systems, a process that is commonly
perceived as being necessary for business development through
the establishment of a commercial organisation, international
patents, distribution of marketing material, elaborate and so-
phisticated Web sites, authoritative statements on the strength
of a system to impress customers, publications and so on.
Thus, a relatively simple but often effective way of maintaining
security with regard to the use of an encryption system is to
not tell anyone about it. The effect of this can be enhanced
by publishing other systems and products that are designed
to mislead the potential attacker. In this sense, information
management and Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) security products should be treated in the same way as
many organisations treat a breach of security, i.e. not to publish
the breach in order to avoid embarrassment and loss of faith
by the client base.
A. Secrets and Ultra-secrets
A classic mistake (of historical importance) of not ‘keep-
ing it quiet’, in particular, not maintaining ‘silent warfare’
[19], was made by Winston Churchill when he published
his analysis of World War I. In his book, The World Crisis
1911-1918, published in 1923, he stated that the British had
deciphered the German Naval codes for much of the war
as a result of the Russians salvaging a code book from the
small cruiser Magdeburg that had ran aground off Estonia on
August 27, 1914. The code book was passed on to Churchill
who was, at the time, the First Sea Lord. This helped the
British maintain their defences with regard to the German
navy before and after the Battle of Jutland in May, 1916. The
German navy became impotent which forced Germany into a
policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. In turn, this led to an
event (the sinking on May 7, 1915 of the Lusitania, torpedoed
by a German submarine, the U-20) that galvanized American
opinion against Germany and played a key role in the United
States’ later entry into the Fisrt World War on April 17, 1917
and the defeat of Germany [20], [21].
Churchill’s publication did not go un-noticed by the Ger-
man military between the First and Second World Wars.
Consequently, significant efforts were made to develop new
encryption devices for military communications. This resulted
in the famous Enigma machine, named after Sir Edward
Elgar’s masterpiece, the Enigma Variations [22]. Enigma was
an electro-mechanical machine about the size of a portable
typewriter which, through application of both electrical (‘plug-
board’) and mechanical (‘rotor’) settings offered ∼ 2 × 1020
permutations for establishing a ‘key’. The machine could be
1By encoding the encrypted message in the least significant bit or bit-pair
of the host data, for example.
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used without difficulty by semi-skilled operators under the
most extreme battle conditions. The keys could be changed
daily or several times a day according to the number of
messages transmitted.
The interest in cryptology by Germany that was undoubt-
edly stimulated by Churchill’s indiscretions included establish-
ing a specialist cipher school in Berlin. Ironically, it was at this
School that some of the Polish mathematicians were trained
who later worked for the Polish Cipher Office, opened in ut-
most secrecy at Poznan in 1930 [23], [24]. In January 1929, the
Dean of the Department of Mathematics, Professor Zdzislaw
Krygowski from the University of Poznan, provided a list of
his best graduates to start working at this office. One of these
graduates was the brilliant young logician, Marian Rejewski
who pioneered the design of the Bomba kryptologiczna, an
electro-mechanical device used for eliminating combinations
that had not been used to encrypt a message with the Enigma
cipher [25]. However, the design of the Bomba kryptologiczna
was only made possible through the Poles gaining access to the
Enigma machine and obtaining knowledge of its mechanism
without alerting the Germans to their activities. In modern
terms, this is equivalent to obtaining information on the type
of encryption algorithm used in a cryptosystem.
The Bomba kryptologiczna helped the Poles to decipher
some 100,000 Enigma messages from as early January 1933 to
September 1939 including details associated with the remili-
tarization of the Rhine Province, Anschluss of Austria and
seizure of the Sudetenland. It was Rejewski’s original work
that formed the basis for designing the advanced electro-
mechanical and later, the electronic decipher machines (in-
cluding ‘Colossus’ - the world’s first programmable computer)
constructed and utilized at Bletchley Park between 1943 and
1945 [26], [27].
After the Second World War, Winston Churchill made sure
that he did not repeat his mistake, and what he referred to
as his ‘Ultra-secret’ - the code breaking activities undertaken
at Station X in Bletchley Park, England - was ordered by
him to be closed down and the technology destroyed soon
after the end of the war. Further, Churchill never referred
to his Ultra-secret in any of his publications after the war.
Those personnel who worked at Bletchley Park were required
to maintain their silence for some fifty years afterwards and
some of the activities at Bletchley Park remain classified to
this day. Bletchley Park is now a museum which includes
a reconstruction of ‘Colossus’ undertaken in the mid-1990s.
However, the type of work undertaken there in the early 1940s
continues in many organisations throughout the world such
as the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ)
based at Cheltenham in England [28] where a range of
‘code making’ and ‘code breaking’ activities continue to be
developed.
The historical example given above clearly illustrates the
importance of maintaining a level of secrecy when undertaking
cryptographic activities. It also demonstrates the importance
of not publishing new algorithms, a principle that is at odds
with the academic community; namely, that the security of
a cryptosystem should not depend upon algorithm secrecy.
However, this has to be balanced with regard to the dissem-
ination of information in order to advance a concept through
peer review, national and international collaboration. Taken to
an extreme, the secrecy factor can produce a psychological
imbalance that is detrimental to progress. Some individuals
like to use confidential information to enhance their status.
In business, this often leads to issues over the signing of
Non-Disclosure Agreements or NDAs, for example, leading
to delays that are of little value, especially when it turns out
that there is nothing worth disclosing. Thus, the whole issue
of ‘keeping it quiet’ has to be implemented in a way that is
balanced, such that confidentiality does not lead to stagnation
in the technical development of a cryptosystem. However, used
correctly and through the appropriate personality, issues over
confidentiality coupled with the ‘feel important’ factor can be
used to good effect in the dissemination of disinformation.
B. Home-Spun Systems Development
The development and public use of information security
technology is one of the most interesting challenges for state
control over the ‘information society’. As more and more
members of the younger generation become increasingly IT
literate, it is inevitable that a larger body of perfectly able
minds will become aware of the fact that cryptology is
not as difficult as they may have been led to believe. As
with information itself, the days when cryptology was in the
hands of a select few with impressive academic credentials
and/or luxury civil service careers are over and cryptosystems
can now be developed by those with a diverse portfolio of
backgrounds which does not necessarily include a University
education. This is reflected in the fact that after the Cold War,
the UK Ministry of Defence, for example, developed a strategy
for developing products driven by commercially available
systems. This Commercial-Off-The-Shelf or COTS approach
to defence technology has led directly to the downsizing of
the UK Scientific Civil Service which, during the Cold War,
was a major source of scientific and technical innovation.
The average graduate of today can rapidly develop the
ability to write an encryption system which, although relatively
simple, possibly trivial and ill-informed, can, by the very na-
ture of its non-compliance to international standards, provide
surprisingly good security. This can lead to problems with
the control and management of information when increasingly
more individuals, groups, companies, agencies and nation
states decide that they can ‘go it alone’ and do it themselves.
While each home grown encryption system may be relatively
weak, compared to those that have had expert development
over many years, have been well financed and been tested
against the very best of attack strategies, the proliferation of
such systems is itself a source of significant difficulty for any
authority whose role is to monitor communications traffic in a
way that is timely and cost effective. This is why governments
world-wide are constantly attempting to control the use and
exploitation of new encryption methods in the commercial
sector2. It also explains the importance of international en-
cryption standards in terms of both public perception and
2For example, the introduction of legislation in mainland UK concerning
the decryption of messages by a company client through enforcement of the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (RIP) Act, 2000.
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free market exploitation. Government and other controlling
authorities like to preside over a situation in which everybody
else is confidently reliant for their information security on
products that have been developed by the very authorities
that encourage their use, a use that is covertly ‘diffused’ into
the ‘information society’ through various legitimate business
ventures coupled with all the usual commercial sophistication
and investment portfolios. Analysis of this type can lead to a
range of unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, but it is only by
thinking through such possible scenarios, that new concepts in
information management, some of which may be of practical
value, are evolved. The proliferation of stand-alone encryption
systems that are designed and used by informed individuals
is not only possible but inevitable, an inevitability that is
guided by the principle that if you want to know what you are
eating then you should cook it yourself. Security issues of this
type have become the single most important agenda for future
government policy on information technology, especially when
such systems have been ‘home spun’ by those who have
learned to fully respect that they should, in the words of
Shakespeare, ‘Neither a borrower, nor a lender be’3.
C. Disinformation
Disinformation is used to tempt the ‘enemy’ into believing
certain kinds of information. The information may not be true
or contain aspects that are designed to cause the enemy to
react in an identifiable way that provides a strategic advantage
[29], [30]. Camouflage, for example, is a simple example of
disinformation [31]. This includes techniques for transforming
encrypted data into forms that resemble the environments
through which an encrypted message is to be sent [32], [33].
At a more sophisticated level, disinformation can include
encrypted messages that are created with the sole purpose of
being broken in order to reveal information that the enemy
will react to by design.
Disinformation includes arranging events and processes
that are composed to protect against an enemy acquiring
knowledge of a successful encryption technology and/or a
successful attack strategy. A historically significant example of
this involved the Battle of Crete which began on the morning
of 20 May 1941 when Nazi Germany launched an airborne
invasion of Crete under the code-name Unternehmen Merkur
(Operation Mercury) [34]. During the next day, through mis-
communication and the failure of Allied commanders to grasp
the situation, the Maleme airfield in western Crete fell to the
Germans which enabled them to fly in heavy reinforcements
and overwhelm the Allied forces. This battle was unique in
two respects: it was the first airborne invasion in history4;
it was the first time the Allies made significant use of their
ability to read Enigma codes. The British had known for some
weeks prior to the invasion of Crete that an invasion was
likely because of the work being undertaken at Bletchley Park.
They faced a problem because of this. If Crete was reinforced
in order to repel the invasion then Germany would suspect
3From William Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet.
4Illustrating the potential of paratroopers and so initiating the Allied
development of their own airborne divisions.
that their encrypted communications were being compromised.
But this would also be the case if the British and other
Allied troops stationed on Crete were evacuated. The decision
was, therefore, taken by Churchill to let the German invasion
proceed with success but not without giving the invaders
a ‘bloody nose’. Indeed, in light of the heavy casualties
suffered by the parachutists, Hitler forbade further airborne
operations and Crete was dubbed ‘the graveyard of the German
parachutists’. The graveyard for German, British, Greek and
Allied soldiers alike was not a product of a fight over desirable
and strategically important territory (at least for the British). It
was a product of the need to secure Churchill’s ‘Ultra-secret’.
In other words, the Allied efforts to repulse the German
invasion of Crete was, in reality, a form of disinformation,
designed to secure a secret that was, in the bigger picture,
more important than the estimated 16,800 dead and wounded
that the battle cost.
D. Plausible Deniability
Deniable encryption allows an encrypted message to be
decrypted in such a way that different and plausible plaintexts
can be obtained using different keys [35]. The idea is to make
it impossible for an attacker to prove the existence of the real
message, a message that requires a specific key. This approach
provides the user with a solution to the ‘gun to the head
problem’ as it allows the sender to have plausible deniability
if compelled to give up the encryption key.
There are a range of different methods that can be designed
to implement such a scheme. For example, a single ciphertext
can be generated that is composed of randomised segments
or blocks of data which correlate to blocks of different
plaintexts encrypted using different keys. A further key is
then required to assemble the appropriate blocks in order to
generate the desired decrypt. This approach, however, leads to
ciphertext files that are significantly larger than the plaintexts
they contain. On the other hand, a ciphertext file should not
necessarily be the same size as the plaintext file and padding
out the plaintext before encryption can be used to increase the
Entropy of the ciphertext (as discussed in Section VIII).
Other methods used for deniable encryption involve estab-
lishing a number of abstract ‘layers’ that are decrypted to yield
different plaintexts for different keys. Some of these layers are
designed to include so-called ‘chaff layers’. These are layers
that are composed of random data which provide the owner of
the data to have plausible deniability of the existence of layers
containing the real ciphertext data. The user can store ‘decoy
files’ on one or more layers while denying the existence of
others, identifying the existence of chaff layers as required.
The layers are based on file systems that are typically stored
in a single directory consisting of files with filenames that
are either randomized (in the case where they belong to chaff
layers), or are based on strings that identify cryptographic data,
the timestamps of all files being randomized throughout.
E. Obfuscation
In a standard computing (windows) environment, a simple
form of camouflage can be implemented by renaming files to
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be of a different type; for example, storing an encrypted data
file as a .exe or .dll file. Some cryptosystems output files with
identifiable extensions such as .enc which can then be simply
filtered by a firewall. Another example includes renaming files
in order to access data and/or execute an encryption engine.
For example, by storing an executable file as a .dll (dynamic
link library) file (which has a similar structure to a .exe file) in
a directory full of real .dll files associated with some complex
applications package, the encryption engine can be obfuscated,
especially if it has a name that is similar to the environment
of files in which it is placed. By renaming the file back to its
‘former self’, execution of a cryptosystem can be undertaken
in the usual way. However, this requires that the executable file
is forensically inert, i.e. it does not contain data that reflects
its purpose. A simple way of implementing this requirement is
to ensure that the source code (prior to compilation) is devoid
of any arrays, comments etc. that include references (through
use of named variables, for example) to the type of application
(e.g. comments such as encrypt the data or named arrays such
as decrypt array[i]).
F. Steganographic Encryption
It is arguable that disinformation should, where possible,
be used in conjunction with the exchange of encrypted in-
formation which has been camouflaged using steganographic
techniques for hiding the ciphertext. For example, suppose
that it had been known by Germany that the Enigma ciphers
were being compromised by the British during the Second
World War. Clearly, it would have then been strategically
advantageous for Germany to propagate disinformation using
Enigma. If, in addition, ‘real information’ had been encrypted
differently and the ciphertexts camouflaged using broadcasts
through the German home radio service, for example, then
the outcome of the war could have been very different. The
use of new encryption methods coupled with camouflage and
disinformation, all of which are dynamic processes, provides a
model that, while not always of practical value, is strategically
comprehensive and has only rarely been fully realised. Never-
theless, some of the techniques that have been developed and
are reported in this work are the result of an attempt to realise
this model.
III. BASIC CONCEPTS
Irrespective of the wealth of computational techniques that
can be invented to encrypt data, there are some basic con-
cepts that are a common theme in modern cryptography.
The application of these concepts typically involves the use
of random number generators and/or the use of algorithms
that originally evolved for the generation of random number
streams, algorithms that are dominated by two fundamental
and interrelated themes [4]-[6]: (i) the use of modular arith-
metic; (ii) the application of prime numbers. The application
of prime numbers is absolutely fundamental to a large range
of encryption processes and international standards such as
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) details of which are discussed
later.
Fig. 1. Alice and Bob can place a message in a box which can be secured
using a combination lock and sent via a public network - the postal service,
for example.
Using a traditional paradigm, we consider the problem of
how Alice (A) and Bob (B) can pass a message to and from
each other without it being compromised or ‘attacked’ by an
intercept. As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider a simple box
and combination lock scenario. Alice and Bob can write a
message, place it in the box, lock the box and then send it
through an open ‘channel’ - the postal services, for example.
In cryptography, the strength of the box is analogous to the
strength of the cipher. If the box is ‘weak’ enough to be
opened by brute force, then the strength of the lock is relatively
insignificant. This is analogous to a cipher whose statistical
properties are poor, for example, i.e. whose Probability Den-
sity Function (PDF) is narrow and whose information Entropy
is relatively low, with a similar value to the plaintext. The
strength of the lock is analogous to the strength of the key
in a real cryptographic system. This includes the size of the
combination number which is equivalent to the length of the
key that is used. Clearly a four rotor combination lock as
illustrated in Figure 1 represents a very weak key since the
number of ordered combinations required to attempt a brute
force attack to open the lock are relatively low, i.e. for a 4-
digit combination lock where each rotor has ten digits 0-9, the
number of possible combinations is 10000 (including 0000).
However, the box-and-lock paradigm being used here is for
illustrative purposes only.
A. Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption is the simplest and most obvious
approach for Alice and Bob to send messages. Alice and
Bob agree on a combination number a priori. Alice writes
a message, puts it in the box, locks it and sends it off. Upon
receipt, Bob unlocks the box using the combination number
that has been agreed and recovers the message. Similarly,
Bob can send a message to Alice using exactly the same
approach or ‘protocol’. Since this protocol is exactly the same
for Alice and Bob it has a symmetry and thus, encryption
methods that adopt this protocol are referred to as symmetric
encryption methods. Given that the box and the lock have
been designed to be strong, the principal weakness associated
with this method is its vulnerability to attack if a third party
obtains the combination number at the point when Alice and
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Bob invent it and agree upon it. Thus, the principal problem
in symmetric encryption is how Alice and Bob exchange the
key. Irrespective of how strong the cipher and key are, unless
the key exchange problem can be solved in an appropriate and
a practicable way, symmetric encryption always suffers from
the same fundamental problem - key exchange!
If E denotes the encryption algorithm that is used which
depends upon a key K to encrypt plaintext P , then we can
consider the ciphertext C to be given by
C = EK(P ).
Decryption can then be denoted by the equation
P = EK(C).
Note that it is possible to encrypt a number of times using
different keys K1,K2, ... with the same encryption algorithm
to give a double encrypted cipher text
C = EK2(EK1(P ))
or a triple encrypted ciphertext
C = EK3(EK2(EK1(P ))).
Decryption, is then undertaken using the same keys in the
reverse order to which they have been applied, i.e.
P = EK1(EK2(EK3(C))).
Symmetric encryption systems, which are also referred to
as shared secret systems or private key systems, are usually
significantly easier to use than systems that employ different
protocols (such as asymmetric encryption). However, the re-
quirements and methods associated with key exchange some-
times make symmetric systems difficult to use. Examples of
symmetric encryption systems include the Digital Encryption
Standard DES and DES3 (essentially, but not literally, the
Digital Encryption Standard with triple encryption) and the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Symmetric systems are
commonly used in many banking and other financial institutes
and in some military applications. A well known historical
example of a symmetric encryption engine, originally designed
for securing financial transactions, and later used for military
communications, was the Enigma.
B. Asymmetric Ciphers
Instead of Alice and Bob agreeing on a combination number
a priori, suppose that Alice sets her lock to be open with a
combination number known only to her. If Bob then wishes to
send Alice a message, he can make a request for her to send
him an open lock. Bob can then write his message, place it
in the box which is then locked and sent on to Alice. Alice
can then unlock the box and recover the message using the
combination number known only to her. The point here is
that Bob does not need to know the combination number, he
only needs to receive an open lock from Alice. Of course
Bob can undertake exactly the same procedure in order to
receive a message from Alice. Clearly, the processes that are
undertaken by Alice and Bob in order to send and receive a
single message are not the same. The protocol is asymmetric
and we refer to encryption systems that use this protocol as
being asymmetric. Note that Alice could use this protocol to
receive messages from any number of senders provided they
can get access to one of her open locks. This can be achieved
by Alice distributing many such locks as required.
One of the principal weaknesses of this approach relates
to the lock being obtained by a third party whose interest
is in sending bogus or disinformation to Alice. The problem
for Alice is to find a way of validating that a message sent
from Bob (or anyone else who is entitled to send messages
to her) is genuine, i.e. that the message is authentic. Thus,
data authentication becomes of particular importance when
implementing asymmetric encryption systems.
Asymmetric encryption relies on both parties having two
keys. The first key (the public key) is shared publicly. The
second key is private, and is kept secret. When working
with asymmetric cryptography, the message is encrypted using
the recipients’ public key. The recipient then decrypts the
message using the private key. Because asymmetric ciphers
tend to be computationally intensive (compared to symmet-
ric encryption), they are usually used in combination with
symmetric systems to implement public key cryptography.
Asymmetric encryption is often used to transfer a session key
rather than information proper - plaintext. This session key is
then used to encrypt information using a symmetric encryption
system. This gives the key exchange benefits of asymmetric
encryption with the speed of symmetric encryption. A well
known example of asymmetric encryption - also known as
public key cryptography - is the RSA algorithm which is
discussed later. This algorithm uses specific prime numbers
(from which the private and public keys are composed) in
order to realize the protocol.
In order to provide users with appropriate prime numbers, an
infrastructure needs to be established by a third party whose
‘business’ is to distribute the public/private key pairs. This
infrastructure is known as the Public Key Infrastructure or
PKI. The use of a public key is convenient for those who wish
to communicate with more than one individual and is thus a
many-to-one protocol that avoids multiple key-exchange. On
the other hand, a public key provides a basis for cryptanalysis.
Given that C = EK(P ) where K is the public key, the analyst
can guess P and check the answer by comparing C with the
intercepted ciphertext, a guess that is made easier if it is based
on a known Crib - i.e. information that can be assumed to
be a likely component of the plaintext. Public key algorithms
are therefore often designed to resist chosen-plaintext attack.
Nevertheless, analysis of public key and asymmetric systems
in general reveals that the level of security is not as significant
as that which can be achieved using a well-designed symmetric
system. One obvious and fundamental issue relates to the third
party responsible for the PKI and how much trust should
be assumed, especially with regard to legislation concerning
issues associated with the use of encrypted material.
C. Three-Way Pass Protocol
The three-way pass protocol, at first sight, provides a
solution to the weaknesses associated with symmetric and
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asymmetric encryption. Suppose that Alice writes a message,
puts it in the box, locks the box with a lock whose combination
number is known only to her and sends it onto Bob. Upon
receipt Bob cannot open the box, so Bob locks the box with
another lock whose combination number is known only to
himself and sends it back to Alice. Upon receipt, Alice can
remove her lock and send the box back to Bob (secured with
his lock only) who is then able to remove his lock and recover
the message. Note that by using this protocol, Alice and Bob
do not need to agree upon a combination number; this avoids
the weakness of symmetric encryption. Further, Alice and Bob
do not need to send each other open locks which is a weakness
of asymmetric encryption.
The problem with this protocol relates to the fact that it
requires the message (secured in the locked box) to be ex-
changed three times. To explain this, suppose we have plaintext
in the form of an American Standard Code for Information
Interchange or ASCII-value array p[i] say. Alice generates a
cipher n1[i] using some appropriate strength random number
generator and an initial condition based on some long integer
- the key. Let the ciphertext c[i] be generated by adding the
cipher to the plaintext, i.e.
c1[i] = p[i] + n1[i]
which is transmitted to Bob. This is a substitution-based
encryption process and is equivalent to Alice securing the
message in the box with her lock - the first pass. Bob generates
a new cipher n2[i] using the same (or possibly a different)
random number generator with a different key and generates
the ciphertext
c2[i] = c1[i] + n2[i] = p[i] + n1[i] + n2[i]
which is transmitted back to Alice - the second pass. Alice
now uses her cipher to generate
c3[i] = c2[i]− n1[i] = p[i] + n2[i]
which is equivalent to her taking off her lock from the box
and sending the result back to Bob - the third pass. Bob then
uses his cipher to recover the message, i.e.
c3[i]− n2[i] = p[i].
However, suppose that the cipher texts c1, c2 and c3 are
intercepted, then the plaintext array can be recovered since
p[i] = c3[i] + c1[i]− c2[i].
This is the case for any encryption process that is commutative
and associative. For example, if the arrays are considered to
be bit streams and the encryption process undertaken using
the XOR process (denoted by ⊕), then
c1 = n1 ⊕ p,
c2 = n2 ⊕ c1 = n2 ⊕ n1 ⊕ p,
c3 = n1 ⊕ c2 = n2 ⊕ p
and
c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3 = p.
This is because for any bit stream a, b and c
a⊕ a⊕ b = b
and because the XOR operation is both commutative and
associative i.e.
a⊕ b = b⊕ a
and
a⊕ (b⊕ c) = (a⊕ b)⊕ c.
These properties are equivalent to the fact that when Alice
receives the box at the second pass with both locks on it, she
can, in principle, remove the locks in any order. If, however,
she had to remove Bob’s lock before her own, then the protocol
would become redundant.
D. Private Key Encryption
One of the principal goals in private key cryptography is
to design Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNGs) that
provide outputs (random number streams) where no element
can be predicted from the preceding elements given complete
knowledge of the algorithm. Another important feature is to
produce generators that have long cycle lengths. A further
important feature, is to ensure that the Entropy of the random
number sequence is a maximum, i.e. that the histogram of the
number stream is uniform.
The use of modular integer arithmetic coupled with the use
of prime numbers in the development of encryption algorithms
tends to provide functions which are not invertible. They are
one-way functions that can only be used to reproduce a specific
(random) sequence of numbers from the same initial condition.
The basic idea in stream ciphers - as used for private key
(symmetric) cryptography - is to convert a plaintext into a
ciphertext using a key that is used as a seed for the PRNG. A
plaintext file is converted to a stream of integer numbers using
ASCII conversion. For example, suppose we wish to encrypt
the authors surname Blackledge for which the ASCII5 decimal
integer stream or vector is
p = (66, 108, 97, 99, 107, 108, 101, 100, 103, 101).
Suppose we now use the linear congruential PRNG defined
by6
ni+1 = animodP
where a = 13, P = 131 and let the seed be 250659, i.e.
n0 = 250659. The output of this iteration is
n = (73, 32, 23, 37, 88, 96, 69, 111, 2, 26).
If we now add the two vectors together, we generate the cipher
stream
c = n+p = (139, 140, 120, 136, 195, 204, 170, 211, 105, 127).
Clearly, provided the recipient of this number stream has
access to the same algorithm (including the values of the
parameters a and P ) and crucially, to the same seed n0,
5Any code can be used.
6Such a PRNG is not suitable for cryptography and is being used for
illustrative purposes only.
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the vector n can be regenerated and p obtained from c by
subtracting n from c. However, in most cryptographic systems,
this process is usually accomplished using binary streams
where the binary stream representation of the plaintext p and
that of the random number stream or cipher n are used to
generate the ciphertext binary stream c via the process
c = n⊕ p.
Restoration of the plaintext is then accomplished via the
operation
p = n⊕ c = n⊕ n⊕ p.
The processes discussed above are examples of digital
confusion in which the information contained in the field f
(the plaintext) is ‘confused’ using a stochastic function c (the
cipher) via addition (decimal integer process) or with an XOR
operator (binary process). Here, the seed plays the part of a key
that it utilized for the process of encryption and decryption.
This is an example of symmetric encryption in which the key
is a private key known only to the sender and recipient of the
encrypted message.
Given that the algorithm used to generate the random
number stream has public access (together with the parameters
it uses which are typically ‘hard-wired’ in order to provide a
random field pattern with a long cycle length), the problem
is how to securely exchange the key to the recipient of the
encrypted message so that decryption can take place. If the
key is particular to a specific communication and is used once
and once only for this communication (other communications
being encrypted using different keys), then the process is
known as a one-time pad, because the key is only used once.
Simple though it is, this process is not open to attack. In
other words, no form of cryptanalysis will provide a way of
deciphering the encrypted message. The problem is how to
exchange the keys in a way that is secure and, thus, solutions
to the key exchange problem are paramount in symmetric
encryption,
The illustration of stream cipher encryption given above
highlights the problem of key exchange, i.e. providing the
value of n0 to both sender and receiver. In addition to
developing the technology for symmetric encryption (e.g. the
algorithm or algorithms), it is imperative to develop appro-
priate protocols and procedures for using it effectively with
the aim of reducing inevitable human error, the underlying
principles being: (i) the elimination of any form of temporal
correlation in the used algorithm; (ii) the generation of a key
that is non-intuitive and at best random; (iii) the exchange of
the key once it has been established.
E. Public-Private Key Encryption
Public-Private Key Encryption [36]-[40] is fundamentally
asymmetric and in terms of the box and combination-lock
paradigm is based on considering a lock which has two
combinations, one to open the lock and another to lock it. The
second constraint is the essential feature because one of the
basic assumptions in the use of combination locks is that they
can be locked irrespective of the rotor positions. Thus, after
writing a message, Alice uses one of Bob’s specially designed
locks to lock the box using a combination number that is
unique to Bob but is openly accessible to Alice and others
who want to send Bob a message. This combination number
is equivalent to the public key. Upon reception, Bob can open
the lock using a combination number that is known only to
himself - equivalent to a private key. However, to design such
a lock, there must be some mechanical ‘property’ linking
the combination numbers required to first lock it and then
unlock it. It is this property that is the principal vulnerability
associated with public/private key encryption, a property that
is concerned with certain precise and exact relationships that
are unique to the use of prime numbers and their applications
with regard to generating pseudo random number streams and
stochastic functions in general [41].
The most common example of a public-private key encryp-
tion algorithm is the RSA algorithm [39] which gets its name
after the three inventors, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman who
developed the generator in the mid 1970s7. It has since with-
stood years of extensive cryptanalysis. To date, cryptanalysis
has neither proved nor disproved the security of the algorithm
in a complete and self-consistent form which suggests a high
confidence level in the algorithm.
The basic generator is given by
ni+1 = neimod(pq)
where p, q and e are prime numbers and e < pq. Although this
generator can be used to compute a pseudo random number
stream ni, the real value of the algorithm lies in its use for
transforming plaintext Pi (taken to be a decimal integer array
based on ASCII 7-bit code, for example) to ciphertext Ci
directly via the equation
Ci = P ei mod(pq).
We then consider the decryption process to be based on the
same type of transform, i.e.
Pi = Cdi mod(pq).
The problem is then to find d given e, p and q. The ‘key’ to
solving this problem is to note that if ed − 1 is divisible by
(p− 1)(q − 1), i.e. d is given by the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
then
Cdi mod(pq) = P
ed
i mod(pq) = Pimod(pq)
using Fermat’s Little Theorem, i.e. for any integer a and prime
number p
ap = amodp.
Note that this result is strictly dependent on the fact that
ed − 1 is divisible by (p − 1)(q − 1) making e a relative
prime of (p− 1)(q − 1) so that e and (p− 1)(q − 1) have no
common factors except for 1. This algorithm, is the basis for
many public/private or asymmetric encryption methods. Here,
7There are some claims that the method was first developed at GCHQ in
England and then re-invented (or otherwise) by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
in the USA; the method was not published openly by GCHQ - such are the
realities of ‘keeping it quiet’.
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the public key is given by the number e and the product pq
which are unique to a given recipient and in the public domain
(like an individual’s telephone number). Note that the prime
numbers p and q and the number e < pq must be distributed to
Alice and Bob in such a way that they are unique to Alice and
Bob on the condition that d exists! This requires an appropriate
infrastructure to be established by a trusted third party whose
‘business’ is to distribute values of e, pq and d to its clients
a Public Key Infrastructure. A PKI is required in order to
distribute public keys, i.e. different but appropriate values of
e and pq for use in public key cryptography (RSA algorithm).
This requires the establishment of appropriate authorities and
directory services for the generation, management and certifi-
cation of public keys.
Recovering the plaintext from the public key and the cipher
text can be conjectured to be equivalent to factoring the
product of the two primes. The success of the system, which is
one of the oldest and most popular public key cryptosystems, is
based on the difficulty of factoring. The principal vulnerability
of the RSA algorithm with regard to an attack is that e and pq
are known and that p and q must be prime numbers - elements
of a large but (assumed) known set. To attack the cipher, d
must be found. But it is known that d is the solution of
de = mod[(p− 1)(q − 1)]
which is only solvable if e < pq is a relative prime of
(p−1)(q−1). An attack can therefore be launched by searching
through prime numbers whose magnitudes are consistent with
the product pq (which provides a search domain) until the
relative prime condition is established for factors p and q.
However, factoring pq to calculate d given e is not trivial. It
is possible to attack an RSA cipher by guessing the value of
(p − 1)(q − 1) but this is no easier than factoring pq which
is the most obvious means of attack. It is also possible for
a cryptanalyst to try every possible d but this brute force
approach is less efficient than trying to factor pq.
In general, RSA cryptanalysis (see Section IV) has shown
that the attacks discovered to date illustrate the pitfalls to be
avoided when implementing RSA. Thus, even though RSA
ciphers can be attacked, the algorithm can still be considered
secure when used properly. In order to ensure the continued
strength of the cipher, RSA run factoring challenges on their
websites. As with all PKI and other cryptographic products,
this algorithm is possibly most vulnerable to authorities (at
least those operating in the UK) having to conform to the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Section 49.
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS
Any cryptographic system must be able to withstand crypt-
analysis [42] and it is imperative that the design of any
encryption method is subjected to different form of attack.
Traditionally, the design of encryption systems is not always
been based on the use of ‘experts’ with experience in the art of
breaking ciphertext. Some of the ideas reported in this paper
are based on experts with such experience and methods of
cryptanalysis that depend critically on the encryption tech-
niques which have been developed and, therefore, subject to
(long) delays in publication!
Cryptanalysts work on ‘attacks’ to try and break a cryp-
tosystem. In many cases, the cryptanalysts are aware of the
algorithm used and will attempt to break the algorithm in order
to compromise the keys or gain access to the actual plaintext.
It is worth noting that even though a number of algorithms
are freely published, this does not in any way mean that they
are the most secure. Most government institutions and the
military do not reveal the type of algorithm used in the design
of a cryptosystem. The rationale for this is that, if we find it
difficult to break a code with knowledge of the algorithm, then
how much more difficult is it to break a code if the algorithm is
unknown? On the other hand, within the academic community,
security in terms of algorithm secrecy is not considered to be
of high merit and publication of the algorithm(s) is always
recommended. It remains to be understood whether this is
a misconception within the academic world (due in part to
the innocence associated with academic culture) or a covertly
induced government policy (by those who are less innocent!).
For example, in 2003, it was reported that the Americans had
broken ciphers used by the Iranian intelligence services. What
was not mentioned, was the fact that the Iranian ciphers were
based on systems purchased indirectly from the USA and thus,
based on USA designed algorithms [46].
The ‘known algorithm’ approach originally comes from the
work of Auguste Kerchhoff. Kerchhoff’s Principle states that:
A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the
system, except the key, is public knowledge. This principle
was reformulated by Claude Shannon as the enemy knows
the system and is widely embraced by cryptographers world
wide. In accordance with the Kerchhoff-Shannon principle,
the majority of civilian cryptosystems make use of publicly
known algorithms. The principle is that of ‘security through
transparency’ in which open-source software is considered to
be inherently more secure than closed source software. On
this basis there are several methods by which a system can be
attacked where, in each case, it is assumed that the cryptanalyst
has full knowledge of the algorithm(s) used.
A. Basic Attacks
We provide a brief overview of the basic attack strategies
associated with cryptanalysis based on [44].
Ciphertext-only attack is where the cryptanalyst has a
ciphertext of several messages at their disposal. All messages
are assumed to have been encrypted using the same algorithm.
The challenge for the cryptanalyst is to try and recover the
plaintext from these messages. Clearly a cryptanalyst will be
in a valuable position if they can recover the actual keys used
for encryption.
Known-plaintext attack makes the task of the cryptanalysis
simpler because, in this case, access is available to both the
plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. It is then necessary
to deduce the key used for encrypting the messages, or design
an algorithm to decrypt any new messages encrypted with
the same key.
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Chosen-plaintext attack involves the cryptanalyst possessing
both the plaintext and the ciphertext. In addition, the analyst
has the ability to encrypt plaintext and see the ciphertext
produced. This provides a powerful tool from which the keys
can be deduced.
Adaptive-chosen-plaintext attack is an improved version of
the chosen-plaintext attack. In this version, the cryptanalyst
has the ability to modify the results based on the previous
encryption. This version allows the cryptanalyst to choose a
smaller block for encryption.
Chosen-ciphertext attack can be applied when the
cryptanalyst has access to several decrypted texts. In addition,
the cryptanalyst is able to use the text and pass it though a
‘black box’ for an attempted decrypt. The cryptanalyst has to
guess the keys in order to use this method which is performed
on an iterative basis (for different keys), until a decrypt is
obtained.
Chosen-key attack is based on some knowledge of the
relationship between different keys and is not of practical
significance except in special circumstances.
Rubber-hose cryptanalysis is based on the use of human
factors such as blackmail and physical threat for example.
It is often a very powerful attack and sometimes very effective.
Differential cryptanalysis is a more general form of
cryptanalysis. It is the study of how differences in an input
can affect differences in the output. This method of attack is
usually based on a chosen plaintext, meaning that the attacker
must be able to obtain encrypted ciphertexts for some set
of plaintexts of their own choosing. This typically involves
acquiring a Crib of some type as discussed in the following
section.
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which
uses linear relations between inputs and outputs of an
encryption algorithm which holds with a certain probability.
This approximation can be used to assign probabilities to the
possible keys and locate the one that is most probable.
B. Cribs
The problem with any form of chosen-plaintext attack is,
of course, how to obtain part or all of the plaintext in the
first place. One method that can be used is to obtain a Crib.
A Crib, a term that originated at Bletchley Park during the
Second World War, is a plaintext which is known or suspected
of being part of a ciphertext. If it is possible to compare
part of the ciphertext that is known to correspond with the
plaintext then, with the encryption algorithm known, one can
attempt to identify which key has been used to generate the
cipherext as a whole and thus decrypt an entire message. But
how is it possible to obtain any plaintext on the assumption
that all plaintexts are encrypted in their entirety? One way
is to analyse whether or not there is any bad practice being
undertaken by the user, e.g. sending stereotyped (encrypted)
messages. Analysing any repetitive features that can be ex-
pected is another way of obtaining a Crib. For example,
suppose that a user was writing letters using Microsoft word,
for example, having established an electronic letter template
with his/her name, address, company reference number etc.
Suppose we assume that each time a new letter is written, the
entire document is encrypted using a known algorithm. If it
is possible to obtain the letter template then a Crib has been
found. Assuming that the user is not prepared to share the
electronic template (which would be a strange thing to ask
for), a simple way of obtaining the Crib could be to write to
the user in hardcopy and ask that the response from the same
user is of the same type, pleading ignorance of all forms of
ICT or some other excuse. This is typical of methods that
are designed to seed a response that includes a useful Crib.
Further, there are a number of passive cribs with regard to
letter writing that can be assumed, the use of Dear and Yours
sincerely, for example.
During the Second World War, when passive cribs such
as daily weather reports became rare through improvements
in the protocols associated with the use of Enigma and/or
operators who took their work seriously, Bletchley Park would
ask the Royal Air Force to create some ‘trouble’ that was of
little military value. This included seeding a particular area
in the North Sea with mines, dropping some bombs on the
French coast or, for a more rapid response, asking fighter pilots
to go over to France and ‘shoot up’ targets of opportunity8,
processes that came to be known as ‘gardening’. The Enigma
encrypted ciphertexts that were used to report the ‘trouble’
could then be assumed to contain information such as the
name of the area where the mines had been dropped and/or the
harbour(s) threatened by the mines. It is worth noting that the
ability to obtain cribs by gardening was made relatively easy
because of the war in which ‘trouble’ was to be expected and
to be reported. Coupled with the efficiency of the German war
machine with regard to its emphasis on accurate and timely
reports, the British were in a privileged position in which they
could create cribs at will and have some fun doing it!
When a captured and interrogated German stated that
Enigma operators had been instructed to encode numbers by
spelling them out, Alan Turing reviewed decrypted messages,
and determined that the number ‘eins’ appeared in 90% of
the messages. He automated the crib process, creating an
‘Eins Catalogue’, which assumed that ‘eins’ was encoded at
all positions in the plaintext. The catalogue included every
possible key setting which provided a very simple and effective
way of recovering the key and is a good example of how the
statistics (of a word or phrase) can be used in cryptanalysis.
The use of Enigma by the German naval forces (in par-
ticular, the U-boat fleet) was, compared to the German army
and air force, made secure by using a password from one
day to the next. This was based on a code book provided
to the operator prior to departure from base. No transmission
of the daily passwords was required, passive cribs were rare
8Using targets of opportunity became very popular towards the end of the
war. Fighter pilots were encouraged to, in the words of General J Dolittle,
‘get them in the air, get them on the ground, just get them’.
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and seeding activities were difficult to arrange. Thus, if not
for a lucky break, in which one of these code books (which
were printed in ink that disappeared if they were dropped in
seawater) was recovered intact by a British destroyer (HMS
Bulldog) from a damaged U-boat (U-110) on May 9, 1941,
breaking the Enigma naval transmissions under their time-
variant code-book protocol would have been very difficult. A
British Naval message dated May 10, 1941 reads: ‘1. Capture
of U Boat 110 is to be referred to as operation Primrose;
2. Operation Primrose is to be treated with greatest secrecy
and as few people allowed to know as possible...’ Clearly,
and for obvious reasons, the British were anxious to make
sure that the Germans did not find out that U-110 and its
codebooks had been captured and all the sailors who took part
in the operation were sworn to secrecy. On HMS Bulldog’s
arrival back in Britain a representative from Bletchley Park,
photographed every page of every book. The ‘interesting piece
of equipment’ turned out to be an Enigma machine, and the
books contained the Enigma codes being used by the German
navy.
The U-boat losses that increased significantly through the
decryption of U-boat Enigma ciphers led Admiral Carl Doenitz
to suspect that his communications protocol had been com-
promised. He had no firm evidence, just a ‘gut feeling’ that
something was wrong. His mistake was not to do anything
about it9, an attitude that was typical of the German High
Command who were certifiable with regard to their confidence
in the Enigma system. However, they were not uniquely cer-
tifiable. For example, on April 18, 1943, Admiral Yamamoto
(the victor of Pearl Harbour) was killed when his plane was
shot down while he was attempting to visit his forces in the
Solomon Islands. Notification of his visit from Rabaul to the
Solomon’s was broadcast as Morse coded ciphertext over the
radio, information that was being routinely decrypted by the
Americans. At this point in the Pacific War, the Japanese
were using a code book protocol similar to that used by the
German Navy, in which the keys were changed on a daily
basis, keys that the Americans had ‘generated’ copies of. Some
weeks before his visit, Yamamoto had been given the option
of ordering a new set of code books to be issued. He had
refused to give the order on the grounds that the logistics
associated with transferring new code books over Japanese
held territory was incompatible with the time scale of his visit
and the possible breach of security that could arise through a
new code book being delivered into the hands of the enemy.
This decision cost him his life. However, it is a decision
that reflects the problems associated with the distribution of
keys for symmetric cryptosystems especially when a multi-
user protocol needs to be established for execution over a wide
communications area. In light of this problem, Yamamoto’s
decision was entirely rational but, nevertheless, a decision
based on the assumption that the cryptosystem had not already
been compromised. Perhaps it was his ‘faith in the system’ and
thereby his refusal to think the ‘unthinkable’ that cost him his
life!
The principles associated with cryptanalysis that have been
9An instinct can be worth a thousand ciphers, ten-thousand if you like.
briefly introduced here illustrate the importance of using a
dynamic approach to cryptology. Any feature of a security
infrastructure that has any degree of consistency is vulnerable
to attack. This can include plaintexts that have routine phrases
such as those used in letters, the key(s) used to encrypt the
plaintext and the algorithm(s) used for encryption. One of the
principal advantages of using chaoticity for designing ciphers
is that it provides the cryptographer with a limitless and dy-
namic resource for producing different encryption algorithms.
These algorithms can be randomly selected and permuted to
produce, in principle, an unlimited number of Meta encryption
engines that operate on random length blocks of plaintext. The
use of block cipher encryption is both necessary in order to
accommodate the relatively low cycle length of chaotic ciphers
and desirable in order to increase the strength of the cipher
by implementing a multi-algorithmic approach. Whereas in
conventional cryptography, emphasis focuses on the number of
permutations associated with the keys used to ‘seed’ or ‘drive’
an algorithm, chaos-based encryption can focus on the number
of permutations associated with the algorithms that are used,
algorithms that can, with care and understanding, be quite
literally ‘invented on the fly’. Since cryptanalysis requires that
the algorithm is known and concentrates on trying to find
the key, this approach, coupled with other important details
that are discussed later on in this paper, provides a method
that can significantly enhance the cryptographic strength of
the ciphertext. Further, in order to satisfy the ‘innocence’ of
the academic community, it is, of course, possible to openly
publish such algorithms (as in this paper, for example), but in
the knowledge that many more can be invented and published
or otherwise. This provides the potential for generating a
host of ‘home-spun’ ciphers which can be designed and
implemented by anyone who wishes to by-pass established
practices and ‘cook it themselves’.
V. DIFFUSION AND CONFUSION
In terms of plaintexts, diffusion is concerned with the issue
that, at least on a statistical basis, similar plaintexts should
result in completely different ciphertexts even when encrypted
with the same key. This requires that any element of the input
block influences every element of the output block in an irreg-
ular fashion. In terms of a key, diffusion ensures that similar
keys result in completely different ciphertexts even when used
for encrypting the same block of plaintext. This requires that
any element of the input should influence every element of
the output in an irregular way. This property must also be
valid for the decryption process because otherwise an intruder
may be able to recover parts of the input from an observed
output by a partly correct guess of the key used for encryption.
The diffusion process is a function of the sensitivity to initial
conditions, conditions that a cryptographic system should have
and further, the inherent topological transitivity that the system
should also exhibit causing the plaintext to be mixed through
the action of the encryption process.
Confusion ensures that the (statistical) properties of plain-
text blocks are not reflected in the corresponding ciphertext
blocks. Instead every ciphertext must have a random ap-
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pearance to any observer and be quantifiable through appro-
priate statistical tests. However, diffusion and confusion are
processes that are of fundamental importance in the design and
analysis of cryptological systems, not only for the encryption
of plaintexts but for data transformation in general.
A. The Diffusion Equation
In a variety of physical problems, the process of diffusion
can be modelled in terms of certain solutions to the diffusion
equation whose basic (linear) form is given by10 [45]-[48]
∇2u(r, t)− σ ∂
∂t
u(r, t) = S(r, t),
∇2 = ∂
2
∂x2
+
∂2
∂y2
+
∂2
∂z2
,
u(r, 0) = u0(r), σ =
1
D
,
where D is the ‘Diffusivity’, S is a source term and u
is a function which describes physical properties such as
temperature, light, particle concentration and so on with initial
value u0.
The diffusion equation describes fields u that are the result
of an ensemble of incoherent random walk processes, i.e.
walks whose direction changes arbitrarily from one step to the
next and where the most likely position after a time t is pro-
portional to
√
t. Further, the diffusion equation differentiates
between past and future, i.e. ±t . This is because the diffusing
field u represents the behaviour of some average property of
an ensemble of many ‘agents’ which cannot in general go back
to their original state. This fundamental property of diffusive
processes has a synergy with the use of one-way functions
in cryptology, i.e. functions that, given an input, produce an
output that is not reversible - an output from which it is not
possible to compute the input.
Consider the process of diffusion in which a source of
material diffuses into a surrounding homogeneous medium,
the material being described by some initial condition u(r, 0).
Physically, it is to be expected that the material will increas-
ingly ‘spread out’ as time evolves and that the concentration
of the material decreases further away from the source. The
general solution to the diffusion equation yields a result in
which the spatial concentration of material is given by the
convolution of the initial condition with a Gaussian function.
This solution is determined by considering how the process of
diffusion responds to a single point source which yields the
Green’s function (in this case, a Gaussian function) given by
[48]-[50],
G(r, t) =
1
σ
( σ
4pit
)n
2
exp
[
−
(
σr2
4t
)]
, t > 0, r =| r |
which is the solution to(
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
u(r, t) = δn(r)δ(t)
where δ denotes the Dirac delta function [51], [52] and n =
1, 2, 3 determines the dimension of the solution.
10r = xˆx+ yˆy + zˆz denotes the spatial vector and t denotes time.
Fig. 2. Image of an optical source (left), the same source imaged through
steam (centre) and a simulation of this effect obtained by convolving the
source image with a Gaussian Point Spread Function (right).
In the infinite domain, the general solution to the diffusion
equation can be written in the form [48]
u(r, t) = G(r, t)⊗r ⊗tS(r, t) + σG(r, t)⊗r u(r, 0)
which requires that the spatial extent of the source function is
infinite but can include functions that are localised provided
that S → 0 as r → ∞ - a Gaussian function for example.
The solution is composed of two terms. The first term is
the convolution (in space and time, denoted by ⊗r and ⊗t
respectively) of the source function with the Green’s function
and the second term is the convolution (in space only) of the
initial condition u(r, 0) with the same Green’s function where
G(r, t)⊗r⊗tS(r, t) =
∫ ∫
G(| r−r′ |, t−τ)S(r′, τ)d3r′dτ.
Thus, for example, in two-dimensions, for the case when S =
0, and ignoring scaling by σ/(4pit)), the solution for u is
u(x, y, t) = exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗⊗u0(x, y)
where we have introduced ⊗⊗ to denote the two-dimensional
convolution integral. Here, the field at time t > 0 is given by
the field at time t = 0 convolved with the two-dimensional
Gaussian function exp[−σ(x2 + y2)/(4t)]. This result can,
for example, be used to model the diffusion of light through
an optical diffuser. An example of such an effect is given in
Figure 2 which shows a light source (the ceiling light of a
steam room) imaged through air and through steam together
with a simulation. Steam, as composed of a complex of small
water droplets, effects light by scattering it a large number of
times. The high degree of multiple scattering that takes place
allows us to model the transmission of light in terms of a
diffusive rather than a propagative process where the function
u is taken to denote the intensity of light. The initial condition
u0 is taken to denote the initial image which is, in effect, the
image of the light source recorded through air. As observed
in Figure 2, the details associated with the light source are
blurred through a mixing process which is determined by the
Gaussian function that is characteristic of diffusion processes
in general. In imaging science, functions of this type determine
how a point of light is affected by the convolution process11
and is thus referred to as the Point Spread Function or PSF
[53]. The PSF is a particularly important characteristic of any
imaging system in general, a characteristic that is related to
the physical processes through which light is transformed from
the object plane (input) to the image plane (output).
11Convolution is sometimes referred to by its German equivalent, i.e. by
the word ‘Faltung’ which means ‘mixing’ or ‘diffusing’.
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If we record a diffused field u after some time t = T , is
it possible to reconstruct the field at time t = 0, i.e. to solve
the inverse problem or de-diffuse the field measured? We can
express u(r, 0) in terms of u(r, T ) using the Taylor series
u0(r) ≡ u(r, 0) = u(r, T ) +
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
Tn
[
∂n
∂tn
u(r, t)
]
t=T
.
From the diffusion equation
∂2u
∂t2
= D∇2 ∂u
∂t
= D2∇4u,
∂3u
∂t3
= D∇2 ∂
2u
∂t2
= D3∇6u
and so on. Thus, in general we can write[
∂n
∂tn
u(r, t)
]
t=T
= Dn∇2nu(x, y, T )
and after substituting this result into the series for u0 given
above, we obtain
u0(r) = u(r, T ) +
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
(DT )n∇2nu(r, T )
∼ u−DT∇2u, DT << 1.
B. Diffusion of a Stochastic Source
For the case when(
∇2 − σ ∂
∂t
)
u(r, t) = −S(r, t), u(r, 0) = 0
the solution is
u(r, t) = G(r, t)⊗r ⊗tS(r, t), t > 0.
If a source is introduced in terms of an impulse at t = 0, then
the ‘system’ will react accordingly and diffuse for t > 0. This
is equivalent to introducing a source function of the form
S(r, t) = s(r)δ(t).
The solution is then given by
u(r, t) = G(r, t)⊗r s(r), t > 0.
Observe that this solution is of the same form as the homoge-
neous case with initial condition u(r, 0) = u0(r) and that the
solution for initial condition u(r, 0) = u0(r) is given by
u(r, t) = G(r, t)⊗r [s(r)+σu0(r)] = G(r, t)⊗ru0(r)+n(r, t)
where
n(r, t) = σG(r, t)⊗r s(r), t > 0.
Note that if s is a stochastic function (i.e. a random depen-
dent variable characterised, at least, by a Probability Density
Function (PDF) denoted by Pr[s(r)]), then n will also be
a stochastic function. Also note that for a time-independent
source function S(r),
u0(r) = u(r, T )
+
∞∑
n=1
(−1)n
n!
[(DT )n∇2nu(r, T ) +D−1∇2n−2S(r)]
Fig. 3. Progressive diffusion and confusion of an image (top-left) - from
left to right and from top to bottom - for uniform distributed noise. The
convolution is undertaken using the convolution theorem and a Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT)
and that if S is a stochastic function, then the field u can not
be de-diffused (since it is not possible to evaluate u0 exactly
given Pr[S(r)]). In other words, any error or ‘noise’ associated
with diffusion leads to the process being irreversible - a ‘one-
way’ process. This, however, depends on the magnitude of
the diffusivity D which for large values cancels out the effect
of any noise, thus making the process potentially reversible.
In cryptography, it is therefore important that the process of
diffusion applied (in order that a key affects every bit of the
plaintext irrespective of the encryption algorithm that is used)
has a low diffusivity.
The inclusion of a stochastic source function provides us
with a self-consistent introduction to another important con-
cept in cryptology, namely ‘confusion’. Taking, for example,
the two-dimensional case, the field u is given by
u(x, y) =
σ
4pit
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗⊗u0(x, y) + n(x, y).
We thus arrive at a basic model for the process of diffusion
and confusion, namely
Output=Diffusion+Confusion.
Here, diffusion involves the ‘mixing’ of the initial condition
with a Gaussian function and confusion is compounded in
the addition of a stochastic or noise function to the diffused
output. The relative magnitudes of the two terms determines
the dominating effect. As the noise function n increases in
amplitude relative to the diffusion term, the output will become
increasingly determined by the effect of confusion alone. In
the equation above, this will occur as t increases since the
magnitude of the diffusion term depends of the scaling factor
1/t. This is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the combined
effect of diffusion and confusion for an image of the phrase
Confusion
+
Diffusion
as it is (from left to right and from top to bottom) progressively
diffused (increasing values of t) and increasingly confused for
a stochastic function n that is uniformly distributed. Clearly,
the longer the time taken for the process of diffusion to occur,
the more the output is confusion dominated. This is consistent
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with all cases when the level of confusion is high and when
the stochastic field used to generate this level of confusion
is unknown (other than possible knowledge of its PDF).
However, if the stochastic function has been synthesized12 and
is thus known a priori, then we can compute
u(x, y)− n(x, y) = σ
4pit
exp
[
− σ
4t
(x2 + y2)
]
⊗⊗u0(x, y)
from which u0 may be computed approximately via applica-
tion of a deconvolution algorithm [53].
VI. STOCHASTIC FIELDS
By considering the diffusion equation for a stochastic
source, we have derived a basic model for the ‘solution
field’ or ‘output’ u(r, t) in terms of the initial condition or
input u0(r). We now consider the principal properties of
stochastic fields, considering the case where the fields are
random variables that are functions of time t.
A. Independent Random Variables
Two random variables f1(t) and f2(t) are independent if
their cross-correlation function is zero, i.e.
∞∫
−∞
f1(t+ τ)f2(τ)dτ = f1(t) f2(t) = 0
where  is used to denote the correlation integral above. From
the correlation theorem [54], [55], it then follows that
F ∗1 (ω)F2(ω) = 0
where
F1(ω) =
∞∫
−∞
f1(t) exp(−iωt)dt
and
F2(ω) =
∞∫
−∞
f2(t) exp(−iωt)dt.
If each function has a PDF Pr[f1(t)] and Pr[f2(t)] respec-
tively, the PDF of the function f(t) that is the sum of f1(t) and
f2(t) is given by the convolution of Pr[f1(t)] and Pr[f2(t)],
i.e. the PDF of the function
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t)
is given by [56], [57]
Pr[f(t)] = Pr[f1(t)]⊗ Pr[f2(t)].
Further, for a number of statistically independent
stochastic functions f1(t), f2(t), ..., each with a PDF
Pr[f1(t)],Pr[f2(t)], ..., the PDF of the sum of these
functions, i.e.
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t) + f3(t) + ...
is given by
Pr[f(t)] = Pr[f1(t)]⊗ Pr[f2(t)]⊗ Pr[f1(t)]⊗ ...
12The synthesis of stochastic functions is a principal issue in cryptology.
These results can derived using the Characteristic Function
[58]. For a strictly continuous random variable f(t) with dis-
tribution function Pf (x) = Pr[f(t)] we define the expectation
as
E(f) =
∞∫
−∞
xPf (x)dx,
which computes the mean value of the random variable, the
Moment Generating Function as
E[exp(−kf)] =
∞∫
−∞
exp(−kx)Pf (x)dx
which may not always exist and the Characteristic Function
as
E[exp(−ikf)] =
∞∫
−∞
exp(−ikx)Pf (x)dx
which will always exist. Observe that the moment generating
function is the (two-sided) Laplace transform [59] of Pf and
the Characteristic Function is the Fourier transform of Pf .
Thus, if f(t) is a stochastic function which is the sum of
N independent random variables f1(t), f2(t), ..., fN (t) with
distributions Pf1(x), Pf2(x), ..., PfN (x), then
f(t) = f1(t) + f2(t) + ...+ fN (t)
and
E[exp(−ikf)] = E[exp[−ik(f1 + f2 + ...+ fN )]
= E[exp(−ikf1)]E[exp(−ikf2)]...E[exp(−ikfN )]
= F1[Pf1 ]F1[Pf2 ]...F1[PfN ]
where F1 is the one-dimensional Fourier transform operartor
defined as
F ≡
∞∫
−∞
dx exp(−ikx).
In other words, the Characteristic Function of the random
variable f(t) is the product of the Characteristic Functions for
all random variables whose sum if f(t). Using the convolution
theorem for Fourier transforms, we then obtain
Pf (x) =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pfi(x) = Pf1(x)⊗ Pf2(x)⊗ ...⊗ PfN (x).
Further, we note that if f1, f2, ..., fN are all identically
distributed then
E[exp[−ik(f1 + f2 + ...+ fN )] = (F [Pf1 ])N
and
Pf (x) = Pf1(x)⊗ Pf1(x)⊗ ...
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B. The Central Limit Theorem
The Central Limit Theorem stems from the result that
the convolution of two functions generally yields a function
which is smoother than either of the functions that are being
convolved. Moreover, if the convolution operation is repeated,
then the result starts to look more and more like a Gaussian
function - a normal distribution - at least in an approximate
sense [60], [61]. For example, suppose we have a number of
independent random variables each of which is characterised
by a distribution that is uniform. As we add more and more of
these functions together, the resulting distribution is then given
by convolving more and more of these (uniform) distributions.
As the number of convolutions increases, the result tends to
a Gaussian distribution. If we consider the effect of applying
multiple convolutions of the uniform distribution
P (x) =
{
1
X , | x |≤ X/2;
0, otherwise
then be considering the effect of multiple convolutions in
Fourier space (through application of the convolution theorem)
and working with a series representation of the result, it can
be shown that (see Appendix I)
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pi(x) ≡ P1(x)⊗ P2(x)⊗ ...⊗ PN (t)
'
√
6
piN
exp(−6x2/XN)
where Pi(x) = P (x), ∀i and N is large. Figure 4 illustrates
the effect of successively adding uniformly distributed but
independent random times series (each consisting of 500
elements) and plotting the resulting histograms (using 32 bins),
i.e. given the discrete times series f1[i], f2[i], f3[i], f4[i] for
i=1 to 500, Figure 4 shows the time series
s1[i] = f1[i],
s2[i] = f1[i] + f2[i],
s3[i] = f1[i] + f2[i] + f3[i],
s4[i] = f1[i] + f2[i] + f3[i] + f4[i]
and the corresponding 32-bin histograms of the signals sj , j =
1, 2, 3, 4. Clearly as j increases, the histogram starts to ‘look’
increasing normally distributed. Here, the uniformly distrib-
uted discrete time series fi, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 have been computed
using the uniform pseudo random number generator
fi+1 = afimodP
where a = 77 and P = 232 − 1 is a Mersenne prime number,
by using four different seeds f0 in order to provide time series
that are ‘independent’.
The Central Limit Theorem has been considered specifically
for the case of uniformly distributed independent random
variables. However, in general, it is approximately applicable
for all independent random variables, irrespective of their
Fig. 4. Illustration of the Central Limit Theorem. The top-left image shows
plots of a 500 element uniformly distributed time series and its histogram
using 32 bins. The top-right image shows the result of adding two uniformly
distributed and independent time series together and the 32 bin histogram.
The bottom-left image is the result after adding three uniformly distributed
times series and the bottom-right image is the result of adding four uniformly
distributed times series.
distribution. In particular, we note that for a standard normal
(Gaussian) distribution given by
Gauss(x;σ, µ) =
1√
2piσ
exp
[
−1
2
(
x− µ
σ
)2]
where ∞∫
−∞
Gauss(x)dx = 1
and
∞∫
−∞
Gauss(x) exp(−ikx)dx = exp(ikµ) exp
(
−σ
2k2
2
)
,
then, since
Gauss(x)⇐⇒ exp(ikµ) exp
(
−σ
2k2
2
)
,
N∏
j=1
⊗ Gauss(x)⇐⇒ exp(ikNµ) exp
(
−Nσ
2k2
2
)
so that
N∏
j=1
⊗ Gauss(x) =
(
1
2piNσ2
)
exp
[
− 1
2N
(
x− µ
σ
)2]
where ⇐⇒ denotes transformation form ‘real’ to ‘Fourier
space’. In other words, the addition of Gaussian distributed
fields produces a Gaussian distributed field.
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VII. STOCHASTIC DIFFUSION
Given the classical diffusion/confusion model of the type
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r)
discussed above, we note that both the operator and the
functional form of p are derived from solving a physical
problem (using a Green’s function solution) compounded in
a particular PDE - diffusion equation. This is an example
of ‘Gaussian diffusion’ since the characteristic Point Spread
Function is a Gaussian function. However, we can use this
basic model and consider a variety of PSFs as required.
Although arbitrary changes to the PSF are inconsistent with
classical diffusion, in cryptology we can, in principal, choose
any PSF that is of value in ‘diffusing’ the data. For example,
in Fresnel optics [62], [63], the PSF is of the same Gaussian
form but with a complex exponential. If f(x, y) is the ‘object
function’ describing the ‘object plane’ and u(x, y) is the image
plane wave function, then [64], [65]
u(x, y) = p(x, y)⊗⊗f(x, y)
where the PSF p is given by (ignoring scaling) [53]
p(x, y) = exp[iα(x2 + y2)]; | x |≤ X, | y |≤ Y
where α = pi/(zλ), λ being the wavelength and z the distance
between the object and image planes, and where X and Y
determine the spatial support of the PSF.
Stochastic diffusion involves interchanging the roles of p
and n, i.e. replacing p(r) - a deterministic PSF - with n(r) -
a stochastic function. Thus, noise diffusion is compounded in
the result
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r) + p(r)
where p can be any function or
u(r) = n1(r)⊗r u0(r) + n2(r)
where both n1 and n2 are stochastic function which may be of
the same type (i.e. have the same PDFs) or of different types
(with different PDFs). This form of diffusion is not ‘physical’
in the sense that it does not conform to a physical model as
defined by the diffusion equation, for example. Here n(r) can
be any stochastic function (synthesized or otherwise).
The simplest form of noise diffusion is
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r).
There are two approaches to solving the inverse problem:
Given u and n, obtain u0. We can invert or deconvolve by
using the convolution theorem giving (for dimension n =
1, 2, 3)
u0(r) = F−1n
[
U(k)N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
where N is the Fourier transform of n and U is the Fourier
transform of u. However, this approach requires regularisation
in order to eliminate any singularities when | N |2= 0 through
application of a constrained deconvolution filter such as the
Wiener filter [53]. Alternatively, if n is the result of some
random number generating algorithm, we can construct the
stochastic field
m(r) = F−1n
[
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2
]
where | N(k) |2> 0, the diffused field now being given by
u(r) = m(r)⊗r u0(r).
The inverse problem is then solved by correlating u with n,
since
n(r)r u(r)⇐⇒ N∗(k)U(k)
and
N∗(k)U(k) = N∗(k)M(k)U0(k)
= N∗(k)
N∗(k)
| N(k) |2U0(k) = U0(k)
so that
u0(r) = n(r)r u(r).
The condition that | N(k) |2> 0 is simply achieved by
implementing the following process: ∀k, if | N(k) |2= 0,
then | N(k) |2= 1. This result can be used to ‘embed’ one
data field in another.
Consider the case when we have two independent images
I1(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y and I2(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y and we consider
the case of embedding I1 with I2. We construct a noise field
m(x, y) ≥ 0∀x, y a priori and consider the equation
u(x, y) = Rm(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y) + I2(x, y)
where
‖m(x, y)⊗⊗I1(x, y)‖∞ = 1 and ‖I2(x, y)‖∞ = 1.
By normalising the terms in this way, the coefficient 0 ≤ R ≤
1, can be used to adjust the relative magnitudes of the terms
such that the diffused image I1 is a perturbation of the ‘host
image’ I2. This provides us with a way of watermarking [66]
one image with another, R being referred to as the watermark-
ing ratio13. This approach could of course be implemented
using a Fresnel diffuser. However, for applications in image
watermarking, the diffusion of an image with a noise field
provides a superior result because: (i) a noise field provides
more uniform diffusion; (ii) noise fields can be generated using
random number generators that depend on a single initial value
or seed (i.e. a private key). An example of this approach is
shown in Figure 5. Here an image I2 (the ‘host image’) is
watermarked by another image I1 (the ‘watermark image’) and
because R = 0.1, the output u is ‘dominated’ by the image
I2. The noise field n, is computed using a uniform random
number generator in which the output array n is normalized
so that ‖n‖∞ = 1 and used to generate n(xi, yi) on a row-
by-row basis. Here, the seed is any integer such as 1873...
which can be based on the application of a PIN (Personal
Identity Number) or a password (e.g. ‘Enigma’, which in terms
of an ASCII string - using binary to decimal conversion - is
‘216257556149’). Recovery of the watermark image requires
13Equivalent, in this application, to the standard term ‘Signal-to-Noise’ or
SNR ratio as used in signal and image analysis.
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Fig. 5. Example of watermarking an image with another image using noise
based diffusion. The ‘host image’ I2 (top-left ) is watermarked with the
‘watermark image’ I1 (top-centre) using the diffuser (top-right) given by a
uniform noise field n whose pixel-by-pixel values depend upon the seed used
(the private key). The result of computing m⊗⊗I1 (bottom-left) is added to
the host image for R = 0.1 to generate the watermarked image u (bottom-
centre). Recovery of the watermark image I1 (bottom-right) is accomplished
by subtracting the host image from the watermarked image and correlating
the result with the noise field n.
knowledge of the PIN or Password and the host image I2
The effect of adding the diffused watermark image to the
host image yields a different, slightly brighter image because
of the perturbation of I2 by Rm ⊗ ⊗I1. This effect can be
minimized by introducing a smaller watermarking ratio such
that the perturbation is still recoverable by subtracting the host
image from the watermarked image.
The expected statistical distribution associated with the
output of a noise diffusion process is Gaussian. This can be
shown if we consider u0 to be a strictly deterministic function
described by a sum of delta functions, equivalent to a binary
stream in 1D or a binary image in 2D (discrete cases), for
example. Thus if
u0(r) =
∑
i
δn(r− ri)
then
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r) =
N∑
i=1
n(r− ri).
Now, each function n(r − ri) is just n(r) shifted by ri and
will thus be identically distributed. Hence
Pr[u(r)] = Pr
[
N∑
i=1
n(r− ri)
]
=
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pr[n(r)]
and from the Central Limit Theorem, we can expect Pr[u(r)]
to be normally distributed for large N . This is illustrated in
Figure 6 which shows the statistical distributions associated
with a binary image, a uniformly distributed noise field and
the output obtained by convolving the two fields together.
Given the equation
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r),
if the diffusion by noise is based on interchanging p and
n, then the diffusion of noise is based on interchanging u0
Fig. 6. Binary image (top-left), uniformly distributed 2D noise field (top-
centre), convolution (top-right) and associated 64-bin histograms (bottom-left,
-centre and -right respectively).
and n. In effect, this means that we consider the initial field
u0 to be a stochastic function. Note that the solution to
the inhomogeneous diffusion equation for a stochastic source
S(r, t) = s(r)δ(t) is
n(r, t) = G(r, t)⊗r s(r)
and thus, n can be considered to be diffused noise. If we
consider the model
u(r) = p(r)⊗r n(r),
then for the classical diffusion equation, the PSF is a Gaussian
function. In general, given the convolution operation, p can
be regarded as only one of a number of PSFs that can be
considered in the ‘production’ of different stochastic fields u.
This includes PSFs that define self-affine stochastic fields or
random scaling fractals [67]-[69] that are based on fractional
diffusion processes.
A. Print Authentication
The method discussed above refers to electronic-to-
electronic type communications in which there is no loss of
information. Steganography and watermarking techniques can
be developed for hardcopy data which has a range of appli-
cations. These techniques have to be robust to the significant
distortions generated by the printing and/or scanning process.
A simple approach is to add information to a printed page
that is difficult to see. For example, some modern colour laser
printers, including those manufactured by HP and Xerox, print
tiny yellow dots which are added to each page. The dots are
barely visible and contain encoded printer serial numbers, date
and time stamps. This facility provides a useful forensics tool
for tracking the origins of a printed document which has only
relatively recently been disclosed.
If the watermarked image is printed and scanned back into
electronic form, then the print/scan process will yield an array
of pixels that will be significantly different from the original
electronic image even though it might ‘look’ the same. These
differences can include the size of the image, its orientation,
brightness, contrast and so on. Of all the processes involved
in the recovery of the watermark, the subtraction of the host
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image from the watermarked image is critical. If this process
is not accurate on a pixel-by-pixel basis and deregistered for
any of many reasons, then recovery of the watermark by
correlation will not be effective. However, if we make use
of the diffusion process alone, then the watermark can be
recovered via a print/scan because of the compatibility of the
processes involved. However, in this case, the ‘watermark’ is
not covert but overt.
Depending on the printing process applied, a number of dis-
tortions will occur which diffuse the information being printed.
Thus, in general, we can consider the printing process to
introduce an effect that can be represented by the convolution
equation
uprint = pprint ⊗⊗u.
where u is the original electronic form of a diffused image
(i.e. u = n⊗⊗u0) and pprint is the point spread function of
the printer. An incoherent image of the data, obtained using a
flat bed scanner for example (or any other incoherent optical
imaging system) will also have a characteristic point spread
function pscan. Thus, we can consider a scanned image to be
given by
uscan = pscan ⊗⊗uprint
where uscan is taken to be the digital image obtained from the
scan. Now, because convolution is commutative, we can write
uscan = pscan⊗⊗pprint⊗⊗p⊗⊗u0 = p⊗⊗pscan/print⊗⊗u0
where
pscan/print = pscan ⊗⊗pprint
which is the print/scan point spread function associated with
the processing cycle of printing the image and then scanning
it. By applying the method discussed earlier, we can obtain a
reconstruction of the watermark whose fidelity is determined
by the scan/print point spread function. However, in practice,
the scanned image needs to be re-sized to that of the original.
This is due to the scaling relationship (for a function f with
Fourier transform F )
f(αx, βy)⇐⇒ 1
αβ
F
(
kx
α
,
ky
β
)
.
The size of any image captured by a scanner or other device
will depend on the resolution used. The size of the image
obtained will inevitably be different from the original because
of the resolution and window size used to print the diffused
image u and the resolution used to scan the image. Since
scaling in the spatial domain causes inverse scaling in the
Fourier domain, the scaling effect must be ‘inverted’ before the
watermark can be recovered by correlation since correlation
is not a scale invariant process. Re-sizing the image (using
an appropriate interpolation scheme such as the bi-cubic
method, for example) requires a set of two numbers n and
m (i.e. the n × m array used to generate the noise field
and execute the diffusion process) that, along with the seed
required to regenerate the noise field, provides the ‘private
keys’ needed to recover the data from the diffused image.
An example of this approach is given in Figure 7 which
shows the result of reconstructing four different images (a
Fig. 7. Example of the application of ‘diffusion only’ watermarking. In this
example, four images of a face, finger-print, signature and text have been
diffused using the same noise field m and printed on the front (top-left) and
back (bottom-left) of an impersonalized identity card using a 600 dpi printer.
The reconstructions (top-right and bottom-right, respectively) are obtained
using a conventional flat-bed scanner based on a 300 dpi grey-level scan.
photograph, finger-print, signature and text) used in the design
of an impersonalized debit/credit card. The use of ‘diffusion
only’ watermarking for print security can be undertaken in
colour by applying exactly the same diffusion/reconstruction
methods to the red, green and blue components independently
(as in Figure 7). This provides two additional advantages:
(i) the effect of using colour tends to yield better quality
reconstructions because of the colour combination process; (ii)
for each colour component, it is possible to apply a noise field
with a different seed. In this case, three keys are required to
recover the watermark.
Because this method is based on convolution alone and since
uscan = pscan/print ⊗⊗u0
as discussed earlier, the recovery of the f will not be negated
by the distortion of the point spread function associated
with the print/scan process, just limited or otherwise by its
characteristics. Thus, if an image is obtained of the printed data
field p⊗⊗u0 which is out of focus due to the characteristics
of pscan/print, then the reconstruction of u0 will be out of
focus to the same degree. Decryption of images with this
characteristic is only possible using an encryption scheme that
is based on a ‘diffusion only’ approach. Figure 8 illustrates the
recovery of a diffused image printed onto a personal identity
card obtained using a flat bed scanner and then captured using
mobile phone camera. In the latter case, the reconstruction is
not in focus because of the wide-field nature of the lens used.
However, the fact that recovery of the watermark is possible
with a mobile phone means that the scrambled data can be
transmitted securely and the card holders image (as in this
example) recovered remotely and transmitted back to the same
phone for authentication. This provides the necessary physical
security needed to implement such a scheme in practice and
means that specialist image capture devices are not required
on site.
The diffusion process can be carried out using a variety
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Fig. 8. Original image (top-left), diffused image (top-right), reconstruction
using a flatbed scanner (bottom-left) and reconstruction using a mobile phone
(bottom-right). These images have been scanned in grey scale from the
original colour versions printed on to a personalised identity card at 600dpi
stamp-size (i.e. 2cm×1.5cm).
of different noise fields other than the uniform noise field
considered here. Changing the noise field can be of value
in two respects: first, it allows a system to be designed that,
in addition to specific keys, is based on specific algorithms
which must be known a priori. These algorithms can be
based on different pseudo uniform random number generators
and/or different pseudo chaotic number generators that are
post-processed to provide a uniform distribution of numbers.
Second, the diffusion field depends on both the characteristics
of the watermark image and the noise field. By utilizing
different noise fields (e.g. Gaussian noise, Poisson noise,
fractal noise and so on), the texture of the output field can
be changed. The use of different noise fields is of value
when different textures are required that are aesthetically
pleasing and can be used to create a background that is printed
over the entire document. In this sense, variable noise based
diffusion fields can be used to replace complex print security
features with the added advantage that, by de-diffusing them,
information can be recovered. Further, these fields are very
robust to data degradation created by soiling, for example. In
the case of binary watermark images, data redundancy allows
reconstructions to be generated from a binary output, i.e. after
binarizing the diffusion field (with a threshold of 50% for
example). This allows the output to be transmitted in a form
that can tolerate low resolution and low contrast copying, e.g.
a fax.
The tolerance of this method to printing and scanning is
Fig. 9. Example of the diffusion of composite images with the inclusion of
a reference frame for enhancing and automating the processes of copping and
orientation. In each case the data fields have been printed and scanned at 300
dpi.
excellent provided the output is cropped accurately (to within
a few pixels) and oriented correctly. The processes of cropping
and orientation can be enhanced and automated by providing
a reference frame in which the diffused image is inserted. This
is illustrated in Figure 9 which, in addition shows the effect
of diffusing a combination of images. This has the effect of
producing a diffused field that is very similar but nevertheless
conveys entirely different information.
B. Covert Watermarking
Watermarking is usually considered to be a method in which
the watermark is embedded into a host image in an unobtrusive
way. Another approach is to consider the host image to be
a data field that, when processed with another data field,
generates new information.
Consider two images i1 and i2. Suppose we construct the
following function
n = F2
(
I1
| I1 |2 I2
)
where I1 = F2[i1] and I2 = F2[i2]. If we now correlate n
with i1, then from the correlation theorem
i1 n⇐⇒ I∗1
I1
| I1 |2 I2 ⇐⇒ i2.
In other words, we can recover i2 from i1 with a knowledge of
n. Because this process is based on convolution and correlation
alone, it is compatible and robust to printing and scanning,
i.e. incoherent optical imaging. An example of this is given in
Figure 10. In this scheme, the noise field n is the private key
required to reconstruct the watermark and the host image can
be considered to be a public key.
C. Application to Encryption
One of the principal components associated with the de-
velopment of methods and algorithms to ‘break’ ciphertext is
the analysis of the output generated by an attempted decrypt
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Fig. 10. Example of a covert watermarking scheme. i1 (top-left) is
‘processed’ with i2 (top-middle) to produce the noise field (top-right). i2 is
printed at 600 dpi, scanned at 300 dpi and then re-sampled back to its original
size (bottom-left). Correlating this image with the noise field generates the
reconstruction (bottom-centre). The reconstruction depends on just the host
image and noise field. If the noise field and/or the host image are different
or corrupted, then a reconstruction is not achieved, as in the example given
(bottom-right).
and its evaluation in terms of an expected type. The output
type is normally assumed to be plain text, i.e. the output is
assumed to be in the form of characters, words and phrases
associated with a natural language such as English or German,
for example. If a plain text document is converted into an
image file then the method described in the previous Section
on ‘covert watermarking’ can be used to diffuse the plain text
image i2 using any other image i1 to produce the field n. If
both i1 and n are then encrypted, any attack on these data will
not be able to make use of an ‘analysis cycle’ which is based
on the assumption that the decrypted output is plaintext. This
approach provides the user with a relatively simple method of
‘confusing’ the cryptanalyst and invalidates attack strategies
that have been designed and developed on the assumption that
the encrypted data have been derived from plaintext alone.
VIII. ENTROPY CONSCIOUS CONFUSION AND DIFFUSION
Consider a simple linear array such as a deck of eight cards
which contains the ace of diamonds for example and where
we are allowed to ask a series of sequential questions as to
where in the array the card is. The first question we could
ask is in which half of the array does the card occur which
reduces the number of cards to four. The second question is in
which half of the remaining four cards is the ace of diamonds
to be found leaving just two cards and the final question is
which card is it. Each successive question is the same but
applied to successive subdivisions of the deck and in this way
we obtain the result in three steps regardless of where the
card happens to be in the deck. Each question is a binary
choice and in this example, 3 is the minimum number of binary
choices which represents the amount of information required
to locate the card in a particular arrangement. This is the same
as taking the binary logarithm of the number of possibilities,
since log2 8 = 3. Another way of appreciating this result, is
to consider a binary representation of the array of cards, i.e.
000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111, which requires three digits
or bits to describe any one card. If the deck contained 16
cards, the information would be 4 bits and if it contained 32
cards, the information would be 5 bits and so on. Thus, in
general, for any number of possibilities N , the information I
for specifying a member in such a linear array, is given by
I = − log2N = log2
1
N
where the negative sign is introduced to denote that informa-
tion has to be acquired in order to make the correct choice,
i.e. I is negative for all values of N larger than 1. We can now
generalize further by considering the case where the number
of choices N are subdivided into subsets of uniform size ni. In
this case, the information needed to specify the membership
of a subset is given not by N but by N/ni and hence, the
information is given by
Ii = log2 Pi
where Pi = ni/N which is the proportion of the subsets.
Finally, if we consider the most general case, where the subsets
are non-uniform in size, then the information will no longer
be the same for all subsets. In this case, we can consider the
mean information given by
I =
N∑
i=1
Pi log2 Pi
which is the Shannon Entropy measure established in his
classic works on information theory in the 1940s [70]. Infor-
mation, as defined here, is a dimensionless quantity. However,
its partner entity in physics has a dimension called ‘Entropy’
which was first introduced by Ludwig Boltzmann as a measure
of the dispersal of energy, in a sense, a measure of disorder,
just as information is a measure of order. In fact, Boltzmann’s
Entropy concept has the same mathematical roots as Shannon’s
information concept in terms of computing the probabilities of
sorting objects into bins (a set of N into subsets of size ni) and
in statistical mechanics the Entropy is defined as [71], [72]
E = −k
∑
i
Pi lnPi
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. Shannon’s and Boltzmann’s
equations are similar. E and I have opposite signs, but
otherwise differ only by their scaling factors and they convert
to one another by E = −(k ln 2)I . Thus, an Entropy unit
is equal to −k ln 2 of a bit. In Boltzmann’s equation, the
probabilities Pi refer to internal energy levels. In Shannon’s
equations Pi are not a priori assigned such specific roles and
the expression can be applied to any physical system to provide
a measure of order. Thus, information becomes a concept
equivalent to Entropy and any system can be described in
terms of one or the other. An increase in Entropy implies
a decrease of information and vise versa. This gives rise to
the fundamental conservation law: The sum of (macroscopic)
information change and Entropy change in a given system is
zero.
From the point of view of designing an appropriate substitu-
tion cipher, the discussion above clearly dictates that the cipher
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Fig. 11. A 3000 element uniformly distributed random number stream (top
left) and its 64-bin discrete PDF (top right) with I = 4.1825 and a 3000
element Gaussian distributed random number stream (bottom left) and its 64-
bin discrete PDF (bottom right) with I = 3.2678.
n[i] should be such that the Entropy of the ciphertext u[i] is a
maximum. This requires that a PRNG algorithm be designed
that outputs a number stream whose Entropy is maximum -
as large as is possible in practice. The stream should have a
PDF Pi that yields the largest possible values for I . Figure
11 shows a uniformly distributed and a Gaussian distributed
random number stream consisting of 3000 elements and the
characteristic discrete PDFs using 64-bins (i.e. for N = 64).
The Information Entropy, which is computed directly from the
PDFs using the expression for I given above, is always greater
for the uniformly distributed field. This is to be expected
because, for a uniformly distributed field, there is no bias
associated with any particular numerical range and hence, no
likelihood can be associated with a particular state. Hence,
one of the underlying principles associated with the design of
a cipher n[i] is that it should output a uniformly distributed
sequence of random numbers. However, this does not mean
that the ciphertext itself will be uniformly distributed since if
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r)
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[u0(r)]⊗ Pr[n(r)].
This is illustrated in Figure 12 which shows 128-bin his-
tograms for a 7-bit ASCII plaintext (the LaTeX file associated
with this paper) u0[i], a stream of uniformly distributed inte-
gers n[i], 0 ≤ n ≤ 127 and the ciphertext u[i] = u0[i]+n[i].
The spike associate with the plaintext histogram reflects the
‘character’ that is most likely to occur in the plaintext of a
natural Indo-European language, i.e. a space with ASCII value
32. Although the distribution of the ciphertext is broader than
the plaintext it is not as broad as the cipher and certainly
not uniform. Thus, the Entropy of the ciphertext, although
larger than the plaintext (in this example Iu0 = 3.4491 and
Fig. 12. 128-bin histograms for an 7-bit ASCII plaintext u0[i] (left), a
stream of uniformly distributed integers between 0 and 127 n[i] (centre) and
the substitution cipher u[i] (right).
Iu = 5.3200), the Entropy of the ciphertext is still less than
that of the cipher (in this example In = 5.5302). There are two
ways in which this problem can be solved. The first method
is to construct a cipher n with a PDF such that
Pn(x)⊗ Pu0(x) = U(x)
where U(x) = 1, ∀x. Then
Pn(x) = U(x)⊗Q(x)
where
Q(x) = F−11
(
1
F [Pu0(x)]
)
.
But this requires that the cipher is generated in such a way
that its output conforms to an arbitrary PDF as determined
by the plaintext to be encrypted. The second method is
based on assuming that the PDF of all plaintexts will be of
the form given in Figure 12 with a characteristic dominant
spike associated with the number of spaces that occur in the
plaintext14. Noting that
Pn(x)⊗ δ(x) = Pn(x)
then as the amplitude of the spike increases, the output increas-
ingly approximates a uniform distribution; the Entropy of the
ciphertext increases as the Entropy of the plaintext decreases.
One simple way to implement this result is to pad-out the
plaintext with a single character. Padding out a plaintext
file with any character provides a ciphertext with a broader
distribution, the character ? (with an ASCII decimal integer of
63) providing a symmetric result. The statistical effect of this
is illustrated in Figure 13 where Iu0 = 1.1615, In = 5.5308
and Iu = 5.2537.
IX. STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF A CIPHER
Diffusion has been considered via the properties associated
with the homogeneous (classical) diffusion equation and the
general Green’s function solution. Confusion has been consid-
ered through the application of the inhomogeneous diffusion
14This is only possible provided the plaintext is an Indo-European alpha-
numeric array and is not some other language or file format - a compressed
image file, for example.
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Fig. 13. 127-bin histograms for an 7-bit ASCII plaintext u0[i] (left) after
space-character padding, a stream of uniformly distributed integers between
0 and 255 n[i] (centre) and the substitution cipher u[i] (right).
equation with a stochastic source function and it has been
shown that
u(r) = p(r)⊗r u0(r) + n(r)
where p is a Gaussian Point Spread Function and n is a
stochastic function.
Diffusion of noise involves the case when u0 is a stochastic
function. Diffusion by noise involves the use of a PSF p that
is a stochastic function. If u0 is taken to be deterministic
information, then we can consider the processes of noise
diffusion and confusion to be compounded in terms of the
following:
Diffusion
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r).
Confusion
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r).
Diffusion and Confusion
u(r) = n1(r)⊗r u0(r) + n2(r).
The principal effects of diffusion and confusion have been
illustrated using various test images. This has been undertaken
for visual purposes only but on the understanding that such
‘effects’ apply to fields in different dimensions in a similar
way.
The statistical properties associated with independent ran-
dom variables has also been considered. One of the most
significant results associated with random variable theory is
compounded in the Central Limit Theorem. When data is
recorded, the stochastic term n, is often the result of many
independent sources of noise due to a variety of physical,
electronic and measuring errors. Each of these sources may
have a well-defined PDF but if n is the result of the addition
of each of them, then the PDF of n tends to be Gaussian dis-
tributed. Thus, Gaussian distributed noise tends to be common
in the large majority of applications in which u is a record of
a physical quantity.
In cryptology, the diffusion/confusion model is used in
a variety of applications that are based on diffusion only,
confusion only and combined diffusion/confusion models. One
such example of the combined model is illustrated in Figure 5
which shows how one data field can be embedded in another
field (i.e. how one image can be used to watermark another
image using noise diffusion). In standard cryptography, one
of the most conventional methods of encrypting information
is through application of a confusion only model. This is
equivalent to implementing a model where it is assumed that
the PSF is a delta function so that
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r).
If we consider the discrete case in one-dimension, then
u[i] = u0[i] + n[i]
where u0[i] is the plaintext array or just ‘plaintext’ (a stream
of integer numbers, each element representing a symbol as-
sociated with some natural language, for example), n[i] is
the ‘cipher’ and u[i] is the ‘ciphertext’. Methods are then
considered for the generation of stochastic functions n[i] that
are best suited for the generation of the ciphertext. This is
the basis for the majority of substitution ciphers where each
value of each element of u0[i] is substituted for another value
through the addition of a stochastic function n[i], a function
that should: (i) include outputs that are zero in order that the
spectrum of random numbers is complete15; (ii) have a uniform
PDF. The conventional approach to doing this is to design
appropriate PRNGs or, as discussed later in this work, pseudo
chaotic ciphers. In either case, a cipher should be generated
with maximum Entropy which is equivalent to ensuring that
the cipher is a uniformly distributed stochastic field. However,
it is important to appreciate that the statistics of a plaintext
are not the same as those of the cipher when encryption is
undertaken using a confusion only model; instead the statistics
are determined by the convolution of the PDF of the plaintext
with the PDF of the cipher. Thus, if
u(r) = u0(r) + n(r)
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[n(r)]⊗r Pr[u0(r)].
One way of maximising the Entropy of u is to construct u0
such that Pr[u0(r)] = δ(r). A simple and practical method
of doing this is to pad the data u0 with a single element that
increases the data size but does not intrude on the legibility
of the plaintext.
Assuming that the encryption of a plaintext u0 is undertaken
using a confusion only model, there exists the possibility of
encrypting the ciphertext again. This is an example of double
encryption, a process that can be repeated an arbitrary number
of times to give triple and quadruple encrypted outputs.
However, multiple encryption procedures in which
u(r) = u0(r) + n1(r) + n2(r) + ...
15The Enigma cipher, for example, suffered from a design fault with regard
to this issue in that a letter could not reproduce its self - u[i] 6= u0[i]∀i. This
provided a small statistical bias which was nevertheless significant in the
decryption of Enigma ciphers.
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where n1, n2,... are different ciphers, each consisting of uni-
formly distributed noise, suffer from the fact that the resultant
cipher is normally distributed because, from the Central Limit
Theorem
Pr[n1 + n2 + ...] ∼ Gauss(x).
For this reason, multiple encryption systems are generally not
preferable to single encryption systems. A notable example
is the triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) or DES3 system
[73] that is based on a form of triple encryption and originally
introduced to increase the key length associated with the
generation of a single cipher n1. DES3 was endorsed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as a
temporary standard to be used until the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) was completed in 2001 [74].
The statistics of an encrypted field formed by the diffusion
of u0 (assumed to be a binary field) with noise produces an
output that is Gaussian distributed, i.e. if
u(r) = n(r)⊗r u0(r)
then
Pr[u(r)] = Pr[n(r)⊗r u0(r)] ∼ Gauss(x).
Thus, the diffusion of u0 produces an output whose statistics
are not uniform but normally distributed. The Entropy of a
diffused field using uniformly distributed noise is therefore
less than the Entropy of a confused field. It is for this reason,
that a process of diffusion should ideally be accompanied by
a process of confusion when such processes are applied to
cryptology in general.
The application of noise diffusion for embedding or water-
marking one information field in another is an approach that
has a range of applications in covert ciphertext transmission.
However, since the diffusion of noise by a deterministic
PSF produces an output whose statistics tend to be normally
distributed, such fields are not best suited for encryption.
However, this process is important in the design of stochastic
fields that have important properties for the camouflage of
encrypted data.
X. ITERATED FUNCTION SYSTEMS AND CHAOS
In cryptography, the design of specialized random number
generators with idealized properties forms the basis of many of
the algorithms that are applied. Although the type of random
number generators considered so far are of value in the gen-
eration of noise fields, the properties of these algorithms are
not well suited for cryptography especially if the cryptosystem
is based on a public domain algorithm. This is because it is
relatively easy to apply brute force attacks in order to recover
the parameters used to ‘drive’ a known algorithm especially
when there is a known set of rules required to optimise the
algorithm in terms of parameter specifications. In general
stream ciphers typically use an iteration of the type
xi+1 = f(xi, p1, p2, ...)
where pi is some parameter set (e.g. prime numbers) and x0 is
the key. The cipher x, which is usually of decimal integer type,
is then written in binary form (typically using ASCII 7-bit
code) and the resulting bit stream used to encrypt the plaintext
(after conversion to a bit stream with the same code) using an
XOR operation. The output bit stream can then be converted
back to ASCII ciphertext form as required. Decryption is
then undertaken by generating the same cipher (for the same
key) and applying an XOR operation to the ciphertext (binary
stream). The encryption/decryption procedure is thus of the
same type and attention is focused on the characteristics of
the algorithm that is used for computing the cipher. How-
ever, whatever algorithm is designed and irrespective of its
‘strength’ and the length of the key that is used, in all cases,
symmetric systems require the users to exchange the key. This
requires the use of certain key exchange algorithms. Stream
ciphers are essential Vernam type ciphers which encrypt bit
streams on a bit by bit basis. By comparison block ciphers
operate of blocks of the stream and may apply permutations
and shifts to the data which depend on the key used. In this
section we provide the foundations for the use of IFS for
generating Vernam ciphers that are constructed from random
length blocks of data that are based on the application different
IFS.
A. Background to Chaos
The word Chaos appeared in early Greek writings and
denoted either the primeval emptiness of the universe before
things came into being or the abyss of the underworld [11].
Both concepts occur in the Theogony of Hesiod16. This
concept tied in with other early notions that saw in Chaos
the darkness of the underworld. In later Greek works, Chaos
was taken to describe the original state of things, irrespective
of the way they were conceived. The modern meaning of the
word is derived from Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso - known to
the English speaking world as Ovid), a Roman poet (43BC
- 17AD) and a major influence in early Latin literature, who
saw Chaos as the original disordered and formless mass, from
which the ordered universe was derived.
The modern notion of chaos - apart from being a term to
describe a mess - is connected with the behaviour of dynamical
systems that appear to exhibit erratic and non-predictable
behaviour but, on closer ‘inspection’, reveal properties that
have definable ‘structures’. Thus, compared with the original
Greek concept of chaos, chaotic systems can reveal order,
bounded forms and determinism, a principal feature being their
self-organisation and characterisation in terms of self-affine
structures. This aspect of chaos immediately suggests that
chaotic systems are not suitable for applications to cryptogra-
phy which requires ciphers that have no predictable dynamic
behaviour or structure of any type, e.g. pseudo random number
streams that are uniformly distributed with maximum entropy.
However, by applying appropriate post-conditioning criterion
to a pseudo chaotic number stream, a cipher can be designed
that has the desired properties.
The idea that a simple nonlinear but entirely deterministic
systems can behave in an apparently unpredictable and chaotic
manner was first noticed by the great French mathematician
16Hesiod, 700 BC, one of the earliest Greek poets. His epic ‘Theogony’
describes the myths of the gods.
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Henri Poincare´ in the late Nineteenth Century. In spite of
this, the importance of chaos was not fully appreciated until
the widespread availability of digital computers for numerical
simulations and the demonstration of chaos in various physical
systems. In the early 1960s, the American mathematician,
Edward Lorenz re-discovered Poincare´’s observations while
investigating the numerical solution of a system of non-linear
equations used to model atmospheric turbulence, equations
that are now known as the Lorenz equations.
A primary feature of chaotic systems is that they exhibit
self-affine structures when visualised and analysed in an ap-
propriate way, i.e. an appropriate phase space. In this sense, the
geometry of a chaotic system may be considered to be fractal.
This is the principal feature that provides a link between
chaotic dynamics and fractal geometry.
A key feature of chaotic behaviour in different systems is
the sensitivity to initial conditions. Thus, ‘It may happen that
small differences in the initial conditions produce very great
ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former
will produce an enormous error in the future. Prediction
becomes impossible’ (Edward Lorenz17). This aspect of a
chaotic system is ideal for encryption in terms of the diffusion
requirement discussed earlier, i.e. that a cryptographic system
should be highly sensitive to the initial conditions (the key)
that is applied. However, in a more general context, the
sensitivity to initial conditions of chaotic systems theory is an
important aspect of using the theory to develop a mathematical
description of complex phenomena such a Brownian and
fractional Brownian process, weather changes in meteorology
or population fluctuations in biology. The relative success of
chaos theory for modelling complex phenomena has caused an
important paradigm shift that has provided the first ‘scientific’
explanation for the coexistence of such concepts as law and
disorder, determinism and unpredictability.
Formally, chaos theory can be defined as the study of
complex nonlinear dynamic systems. The word ‘complex’ is
related to the recursive and nonlinear characteristics of the
algorithms involved and the word ‘dynamic’ implies the non-
constant and non-periodic nature of such systems. Chaotic
systems are commonly based on recursive processes, either in
the form of single or coupled algebraic equations or a set of
(single or coupled) differential equations modelling a physical
or virtual system.
Chaos is often but incorrectly associated with noise in
that it is taken to represent a field which is unpredictable.
Although this is the case, a field generated by a chaotic system
generally has more structure if analysed in an appropriate
way, a ‘structure’ that may exhibit features that are similar
at different scales. Thus, chaotic fields are not the same as
noise fields either in terms of their behaviour or the way in
which they are generated. Simple chaotic fields are typically
the product of an iteration of the form xi+1 = f(xi) where the
function f is some nonlinear map which depends on a single
or a set of parameters. The chaotic behaviour of xi depends
critically of the value of the parameter(s). The iteration process
may not necessarily be a single nonlinear mapping but consist
17Cambel, A B, ‘Applied Chaos Theory’, Gorman, 2000.
of a set of nonlinear coupled equations of the form
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where the functions f1, f2, ..., fN may all be nonlinear or
nonlinear and linear. In turn, such a coupled system can be
the result of many different physical models covering a wide
range of applications in science and engineering.
B. Vurhulst Processes and the Logistic Map
Suppose there is a fixed population of N individuals living
on an island (with no one leaving or entering) and a fatal
disease (for which there is no cure) is introduced, which
is spread through personal contact causing an epidemic to
break out. The rate of growth of the disease will normally be
proportional to the number of carriers c say. Suppose we let
x = c/N be the proportion of individuals with the disease so
that 100x is the percentage of the population with the disease.
Then, the equation describing the rate of growth of the disease
is
dx
dt
= kx
whose solution is
x(t) = x0 exp(kt)
where x0 is the proportion of the population carrying the
disease at t = 0 (i.e. when the disease first ‘strikes’) and
k is a constant of proportionality defining the growth rate.
The problem with this conventional growth rate model is
that when x = 1, there can be no further growth of the
disease because the island population no longer exists and
so we must impose the condition that 0 < x(t) ≤ 1, ∀t.
Alternatively, suppose we include the fact that the rate of
growth must also be proportional to the number of individuals
1 − x who do not become carriers, due to isolation of their
activities and/or genetic disposition, for example. Then, our
rate equation becomes
dx
dt
= kx(1− x)
and if x = 1, the epidemic is extinguished. This equation
can be used to model a range of situations similar to that
introduced above associated with predator-prey type processes.
(In the example given above, the prey is the human and the
predator could be a virus or bacterium, for example). Finite
differencing over a time interval ∆t, we have
xi+1 − xi
∆t
= kxi(1− xi)
or
xi+1 = xi + k∆txi(1− xi)
or
xi+1 = rxi(1− xi)
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where r = 1+k∆t. This is a simple quadratic iterator known
as the logistic map and has a range of characteristics depending
on the value of r. This is illustrated in Figure 14 which
shows the output (for just 30 elements) from this iterator
for r = 1, r = 2, r = 3 and r = 4 and for an initial
value of 0.118. For r = 1 and r = 2, convergent behaviour
Fig. 14. Output (30 elements) of the logistic map for values of r = 1 (top
left), r = 2 (top right), r = 3 (bottom left) and r = 4 (bottom right) and an
initial value of 0.1.
takes place; for r = 3 the output is oscillatory and for
r = 4 the behaviour is chaotic. The transition from monotonic
convergence to oscillatory behaviour is known as a bifurcation
and is better illustrated using a so called Fiegenbaum map
or diagram which is a plot of the output of the iterator in
terms of the values produced (after iterating enough times
to produce a consistent output) for different values of r. An
example of this for the logistic map is given in Figure 15
for 0 < r ≤ 4 and shows convergent behaviour for values
of r from 0 to approximately 3, bifurcations for values of r
between approximately 3 and just beyond 3.5 and then a region
of chaotic behaviour, achieving ‘full chaos’ at r = 4 where,
in each case, the output consists of values between 0 and 1.
However, closer inspection of this data representation reveals
repeating patterns, an example being given in Figure 16 which
is a Fiegenbaum diagram of the output for values of r between
3.840 and 3.855 and values of x between 0.44 and 0.52. As
before, we observe a region of convergence, bifurcation and
then chaos. Moreover, from Figure 16 we observe another
region of this map (for values of r around 3.854) in which this
same behaviour occurs. The interesting feature about this map
is that the convergence→bifurcation→chaos characteristics are
repeated albeit over smaller scales. In other words, there is a
similarity of behaviour over smaller scales, i.e. the ‘pattern’
of behaviour. Further, this complex behaviour comes from a
remarkably simple iterator, i.e. the map x→ rx(1− x).
18The initial value, which is taken to be any value between 0 and 1, changes
the ‘signature’ of the output but not its characteristics, at least, in the ideal
case.
Fig. 15. Feigenbaum diagram of the logistic map for 0 < r < 4 and
0 < x < 1.
Fig. 16. Feigenbaum diagram of the logistic map for 3.840 < r < 3.855
and 0.44 < x < 0.52.
C. Examples of Chaotic Systems
In addition to the logistic map, which has been used in
the previous section to introduce a simple IFS that gives
a chaotic output, there are a wide variety of other maps
which yield signals that exhibit the same basic properties
as the logistic map (convergence→bifurcation→chaos) with
similar structures at different scales at specific regions of
the Feigenbaum diagram. Examples, include the ‘maps’ given
below:
1) Linear functions: The sawtooth map
xi+1 = 5ximod4.
The tent map
xi+1 = r(1− | 2xi − 1 |).
The generalized tent map
xi+1 = r(1− | 2xi − 1 |m), m = 1, 2, 3, ...
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2) Nonlinear functions: The sin map
xi+1 =| sin(pirxi | .
The tangent feedback map
xi+1 = rxi[1− tan(xi/2)].
The logarithmic feedback map
xi+1 = rxi − [1− log(1 + xi)].
Further, there are a number of ‘variations on a theme’ that are
of value, an example being the ‘delayed logistic map’
xi+1 = rxi(1− xi−1)
which arises in certain problems in population dynamics.
Moreover, coupled iterative maps occur from the development
of physical models leading to nonlinear coupled differential
equations, a famous and historically important example being
the Lorenz equations given by
dx1
dt
= a(x2−x1), dx2
dt
= (b−x3)x1−x2, dx3
dt
= x1x2−cx3
where a, b and c are constants. These equations were originally
derived by Lorenz from the fluid equations of motion (the
Navier Stokes equation, the equation for thermal conductivity
and the continuity equation) used to model heat convection in
the atmosphere and were studied in an attempt to explore the
transition to turbulence where a fluid layer in a gravitational
field is heated from below. By finite differencing these equa-
tions, we convert the functions xi, i = 1, 2, 3 into discrete
form xni , i = 1, 2, 3 giving (using forward differencing)
x
(n+1)
1 = x
(n)
1 +∆ta(x
(n)
2 − x(n)1 ),
x
(n+1)
2 = x
(n)
2 +∆t[(b− x(n)3 )x(n)1 − x(n)2 ],
x
(n+1)
3 = x
(n)
3 +∆t[x
(n)
1 x
(n)
2 − cx(n)3 ].
For specific values of a, b and c (e.g. a = 10, b = 28 and
c = 8/3) and a step length ∆t, the digital signals x(n)1 , x(n)2
and x(n)3 exhibit chaotic behaviour which can be analysed
quantitatively in the three dimension phase space (x1, x2, x3)
or variations on this theme, e.g. a three dimensional plot with
axes (x1+x2, x3, x1−x3) or as a two dimensional projection
with axes (x1+x2, x3) an example of which is shown in Figure
17. Here, we see that the path is confined to two domains
which are connected. The path is attracted to one domain and
then to another but this connection (the point at which the path
changes form one domain to the next) occurs in an erratic way
- an example of a ‘strange attractor’.
As with the simple iterative maps discussed previously, there
are a number of nonlinear differential equations (coupled or
otherwise) that exhibit chaos the behaviour of which can be
quantified using an appropriate phase space. These in include:
The Ro¨ssler equations
dx1
dt
= −x2 − x3, dx2
dt
= x3 + ax2,
dx3
dt
= b+ x3(x1 + c).
The He´non-Heiles equations
dx1
dt
= px,
dpx
dt
= −x−2xy; dx2
dt
= py,
dpy
dt
= −y−x2+y2.
Fig. 17. Two dimensional phase space analysis of the Lorenz equations
illustrating the ‘strange attractor’.
The Hill’s equations
d2
dt2
x(t) + Ω2(t)x(t) = 0,
a special case being the Mathieu equation when
Ω2(t) = ω20(1 + λ cosωt),
ω0 and λ being constants. The Duffing Oscillator
dx
dt
= v,
dv
dt
= av + x+ bx3 + cos t
where a and b are constants. The non-linear Schro¨dinger
equation
d2
dt2
x(t) + ω2x(t) =| x(t) |2 x(t).
In each case, the chaotic nature of the output to these systems
depends on the values of the constants.
For iterative processes where stable convergent behaviour is
expected, an output that is characterised by exponential growth
can be taken to be due to unacceptable numerical instability.
However, with IFS that exhibit intrinsic instability, in that the
output does not converge to a specific value, the Lyapunov
exponent is used to quantify the characteristics of the output.
This exponent or ‘Dimension’ provides a principal measure of
‘chaoticity’ and is derived in Appendix II.
XI. ENCRYPTION USING DETERMINISTIC CHAOS
The use of chaos in cryptology was first considered in the
early 1950s by the American electrical engineer Claude Shan-
non and the Russian mathematician Vladimir Alexandrovich
Kotelnikov who laid the theoretical foundations for modern
information theory and cryptography. It was Shannon who
first explicitly mentioned the basic stretch-and-fold mechanism
associated with chaos for the purpose of encryption: Good mix-
ing transformations are often formed by repeated products of
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two simple non-commuting operations [11]. Hopf19 considered
the mixing of dough by such a sequence of non-commuting
operations. The dough is first rolled out into a thin slab, then
folded over, then rolled, and then folded again and so on. The
same principle is used in the making of a Japanese sword,
the aim being to produce a material that is a highly diffused
version of the original material structure.
The use of chaos in cryptography was not fully appre-
ciated until the late 1980s when the simulation of chaotic
dynamical systems became common place and when the role
of cryptography in IT became increasingly important. Since
the start of the 1990s, an increasing number of publications
have considered the use of chaos in cryptography, e.g. [75]-
[79]. These have included schemes based on synchronized
chaotic (analogue) circuits, for example, which belong to
the field of steganography and secure radio communication
[80]. Over the 1990s cryptography started to attract a variety
of scientists and engineers from diverse fields who started
exploiting dynamical systems theory for the purpose of en-
cryption. This included the use of discrete chaotic systems
such as the cellular automata, Kolmogorov flows and discrete
affine transformations in general to provide more efficient
encryption schemes [81]-[84]. Since 2000, the potential of
chaos-based communications, especially with regard to spread
spectrum modulation, has been recognized. Many authors have
described chaotic modulations and suggested a variety of
electronics based implementations, e.g. [77]-[80]. However,
the emphasis has been on information coding and information
hiding and embedding. Much of this published work has been
of theoretical and some technological interest with work being
undertaken in both an academic and industrial research context
(e.g. [85]-[91]). However, it is only relatively recently that
the application of chaos-based ciphers have been implemented
in software and introduced to the market. One example of
this is the basis of the author’s own company - CrypsticTM
Limited - in which the principle of multi-algorithmicity using
chaos-based ciphers [11], [92] has been used to produce meta-
encryption engines that are mounted on a single, a pair or a
group of flash (USB - Universal Serial Bus) memory sticks.
Some of these memory sticks have been designed to include
a hidden memory accessible through a covert procedure (such
as the renaming - by deletion - of an existing file or folder)
from which the encryption engine(s) can be executed.
Consider an algorithm that outputs a number stream which
can be ordered, chaotic or random. In the case of an ordered
number stream (those generated from a discretized piecewise
continuous functions for example), the complexity of the field
is clearly low. Moreover, the information and specifically the
information entropy (the lack of information we have about the
exact state of the number stream) is low as is the information
content that can be conveyed by such a number stream.
A random number stream (taken to have a uniform PDF,
for example) will provide a sequence from which, under ideal
circumstances, it is not possible to predict any number in the
19Hopf, Eberhard F. F, (1902-1983), an Austrian mathematician who made
significant contributions in topology and ergodic theory and studied the mixing
in compact spaces, e.g. On Causality, Statistics and Probability, Journal of
Mathematics and Physics, 13, 51-102, 1934.
sequence from the previous values. All we can say is that
the probability of any number occurring between a specified
range is equally likely. In this case, the information entropy
is high. However, the complexity of the field, in terms of
erratic transitions from one type of localized behaviour to
another, is low. Thus, in comparison to a random field, a
chaotic field is high in complexity but its information entropy,
while naturally higher than an ordered field is lower than that
of a random field, e.g. chaotic fields which exhibit uniform
number distributions are rare. Such fields therefore need to be
post-processed in order that the output conforms to a uniform
distribution.
We consider a dynamic continuous-state continuous-time
system S = 〈X,K, f〉 as follows [11]:
dx
dt
= f (x, k) , x ∈ X, k ∈ K
where f is a a smooth function, X is a state space and K is a
parameter space. The equation is taken to satisfy the conditions
of the existence and uniqueness of solutions x(x0, t) with the
initial condition x0 = x (x0, 0), the solution curve ϕt (x0, t)
being the trajectory.
For cryptography, we focus on dynamic discrete-time sys-
tems which can be written in the following form:
xi+1 = f (xi, k) , xi ∈ X, k ∈ K, i = 0, 1, 2, . . .
where xi is a discrete state of the system. The trajectory
ϕ (xi, x0) is defined by the sequence x0, x1, x2, . . .. This
equation is similar to the cryptographic iterated functions
used for pseudo random number generation, block ciphers and
other constructions such as the DES, RSA nd AES ciphers.
Consequently, in both nonlinear dynamics and cryptography
we deal with an iterated key-dependent transformation of
information. There are several sufficient conditions satisfied
by a dynamic system to guarantee chaos, the sensitivity to
initial conditions and topological transitivity being the most
common.
A chaotic continuous-state discrete-time system is a dy-
namic system S = 〈X, f〉 with two properties [92]: (i) given
a metric space X and a mapping f : X → X , then f
is topologically transitive on X if, for any two open sets
U, V ⊂ X , there is n ≥ 0 such that fn(U) ∩ V 6= ∅; (ii) the
map f is sensitive to initial conditions if there is δ > 0, n ≥ 0
given that for any x ∈ X and for any neighborhood Hx of
x there is y ∈ Hx, such that |fn(x)− fn(y)| > δ. These
properties can be interpreted as follows: a dynamic system
is chaotic if all trajectories are bounded (by the attractor)
and nearby trajectories diverge exponentially at every point
of the phase space. The trajectories are continuous and belong
to a two-dimensional system that is said to be chaotic. This
yields to a natural synergy between chaotic and cryptographic
systems that can be described in terms of the following: (i)
topological transitivity which ensures that the system output
covers all the state space, e.g. any plaintext can be encrypted
into any ciphertext; (ii) sensitivity to initial condition which
corresponds to Shannon’s original requirements for an encryp-
tion system in the late 1940s. In both chaos and cryptography
we are dealing with systems in which a small variation of any
variable changes the outputs considerably.
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A. Stream Cipher Encryption
The use of discrete chaotic fields for encrypting data can
follow the same basic approach as used with regard to the
application of pseudo random number generating algorithms
for stream ciphers. Pseudo chaotic numbers are in principle,
ideal for cryptography because they produce number streams
that are ultra-sensitive to the initial value (the key). However,
instead of using iterative based maps using modular arithmetic
with integer operations, here, we require the application of
nonlinear maps using floating point arithmetic. Thus, the first
drawback concerning the application of deterministic chaos
for encryption concerns the processing speed, i.e. pseudo ran-
dom number generators typically output integer streams using
integer arithmetic whereas pseudo chaotic number generators
produce floating point streams using floating point arithmetic.
Another drawback of chaos based cryptography is that the
cycle length (i.e. the period over which the number stream
repeats itself) is relatively short and not easily quantifiable
when compared to the cycle length available using conven-
tional PRNGs, e.g. additive generators, which commence by
initialising an array xi with random numbers (not all of which
are even) so that we can consider the initial state of the
generator to be x1, x2, x3, ... to which we then apply
xi = (xi−a + xi−b + ...+ xi−m)mod2n
where a, b, ...,m and n are assigned integers20, have very long
cycle lengths of the order of 2f (255 − 1) where 0 ≤ f ≤ n
and linear feedback shift registers with the form
xn = (c1xn−1 + c2xn−2 + cmxn−m)mod2k
which, for specific values of c1, c2, ...cm have cycle lengths
of 2k.
The application of deterministic chaos to encryption has two
distinct disadvantages relative to the application of PRNGs.
Another feature of IFS is that the regions over which chaotic
behaviour can be generated may be limited. However, this
limitation can be overcome by designing IFS with the specific
aim of increasing the range of chaos. One method is to use
well known maps and modify them to extend the region of
chaos. For example, the Matthews cipher is a modification of
the logistic map to [93]
xi+1 = (1 + r)
(
1 +
1
r
)r
xi(1− xi)r, r ∈ (0, 4].
The effect of this generalization is seen in Figure 18 which
shows the Feigenbaum diagram for values of r between 1 and
4. Compared to the conventional logistic map xi+1 = rxi(1−
xi), r ∈ (0, 4] which yields full chaos at r = 4, the chaotic
behaviour of the Matthews map is clearly more extensive
providing full chaos for the majority (but not all) of values of
r between approximately 0.5 and 4. In the conventional case,
the key is the value of x0 (the initial condition). In addition,
because there is a wide range of chaotic behaviour for the
Matthews map, the value of r itself can be used as a primary
(or secondary) key.
20A well known example is the ‘Fish generator’ xi = (xi−55 +
xi−24)mod232
Fig. 18. Feigenbaum map of the Matthews cipher
The approach to using deterministic chaos for encryption
has to date, been based on using conventional and other
well known chaotic models of the type discussed above with
modifications such as the Matthew map as required. However,
in cryptography, the physical model from which a chaotic
map has been derived is not important; only the fact that
the map provides a cipher that is ‘good’ at scrambling the
plaintext in terms of diffusion and confusion. This point leads
to an approach which exploits two basic features of chaotic
maps: (i) they increase the complexity of the cipher; (ii)
there are an unlimited number of maps of the form xi+1 =
f(xi), for example, that can be literally ‘invented’ and then
tested for chaoticity to produce a data base of algorithms.
However, it is important to stress that such ciphers, once
‘invented’, need to be post-processed to ensure that the cipher
stream is uniformly distributed which, in turn, requires further
computational overheads and, as discussed in the following
section, may include significant cipher redundancy.
The low cycle lengths associated with chaotic iterators can
be overcome by designing block ciphers where the iterator
produces a cipher stream only over a block of data whose
length is significantly less than that of the cycle length of
the iterator, each block being encrypted using a different
key and/or algorithm. The use of different algorithms for
encrypting different blocks of data provides an approach that
is ‘multi-algorithmic’.
B. Block Cipher Encryption and Multi-algorithmicity
Instead of using a single algorithm (such as a Matthews
cipher) to encrypt data over a series of blocks using different
(block) keys, we can use different algorithms, i.e. chaotic
maps. Two maps can be used to generate the length of each
block and the maps that are used to encrypt the plaintext
over each block. Thus, let us suppose we have designed a
data base consisting of 100 chaotic maps consisting of IFS
f1, f2, f3, ..., f100, each of which generates a floating point
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number steam through the operation
xi+1 = fm(xi, p1, p2, ...)
where the parameters p1, p2, ... are pre-set or ‘hard-wired’ to
produce chaos for any initial value x0 ∈ (0, 1). An ‘algorithm
selection key’ is then introduced in which two algorithms (or
possibly the same algorithm) are chosen to ‘drive’ the block
cipher - f50 and f29 say, the key in this case being (50, 29).
Here, we shall consider the case where map f50 determines
the algorithm selection and map f29 determines the block size.
Suppose map f50 is then initiated with the key 0.26735625,
for example, and map f29 with the key 0.65376301. The
output from these maps (floating point number streams) are
then normalized, multiplied by 100 and 1000, respectively,
for example, and then rounded to produce integer streams with
values ranging from 1 to 100 and 1 to 1000, respectively. Let
us suppose that the first few values of these integer streams
are 28, 58, 3, 61 and 202, 38, 785, 426, respectively. The block
encryption starts by using map 28 to encrypt 202 elements of
the plaintext using the key 0.78654876 say. The second block
of 38 elements is then encrypted using map 58 (the initial
value being the last floating point value produced by algorithm
28) and the third block of 785 elements is encrypted using
algorithm 3 (the initial value being the last floating point value
produced by algorithm 58) and so on. The process continues
until the plaintext has been fully encrypted with the ‘session
key’ (50,29,0.26735625,0.65376301,0.78654876).
Encryption is typically undertaken using a binary repre-
sentation of the plaintext and applying an XOR operation
using a binary representation of the cipher stream. This can be
constructed using a variety of ways. For example, one could
extract the last significant bits from the floating point format
of xi. Another approach, is to divide the floating point range
of the cipher into two compact regions and apply a suitable
threshold. For example, suppose that the output xi from a map
operating over a given block consists of floating point value
between 0 and 1, then, with the application of a threshold of
0.5, we can consider generating the bit stream
b(xi) =
{
1, xi ∈ (0.5, 1];
0, xi ∈ [0, 0.5).
However, in applying such a scheme, we are assuming that
the distribution of xi is uniform and this is rarely the case
with chaotic maps. Figure 19 shows the PDF for the logistic
map xi+1 = 4xi(1 − xi) which reveals a non-uniform
distribution with a bias for floating point numbers approaching
0 and 1. However, the mid range (i.e. for xi ∈ [0.3, 0.7]) is
relatively flat indicating that the probability for the occurrence
of different numbers generated by the logistic map in the mid
range is the same. In order to apply the threshold partitioning
method discussed above in a way that provides an output that
is uniformly distributed for a any chaotic map, it is necessary
to introduce appropriate conditions and modify the above to
the form
b(xi) =

1, xi ∈ [T, T +∆+);
0, xi ∈ [T −∆−, T );
−1, otherwise.
Fig. 19. Probability density function (with 100 bins) of the output from the
logistic map for 10000 iterations.
Fig. 20. Illustration of the effect of using multiple algorithms for generating
a stream cipher on the computational Energy required to attempt a brute force
attack.
where T is the threshold and ∆+ and ∆− are those values
which yield an output stream that characterizes (to a good
approximation) a uniform distribution. For example, in the
case of the logistic map T = 0.5 and ∆+ = ∆− =
0.2. This aspect of the application of deterministic chaos to
cryptography, together with the search for a parameter or set
of parameters that provides full chaos for an ‘invented’ map,
determines the overall suitability of the function that has been
‘invented’ for this application.
The ‘filtering’ of a chaotic field to generate a uniformly dis-
tributed output is equivalent to maximizing the entropy of the
cipher stream (i.e. generating a cipher stream with a uniform
PDF) which is an essential condition in cryptography. In terms
of cryptanalysis and attack, the multi-algorithmic approach to
designing a block cipher introduces a new ‘dimension’ to the
problem. The conventional problem associated with an attack
on a symmetric cipher is to search for the private key(s) given
knowledge of the algorithm. Here, the problem is to search
not only for the session key(s), but the algorithms they ‘drive’
as illustrated in Figure 20.
One over-riding issue concerning cryptology in general, is
that algorithm secrecy is weak. In other words, a cryptographic
system should not rely on the secrecy of its algorithms and
all such algorithms should be openly published21. The system
described here is multi-algorithmic, relying on many different
chaotic maps to encrypt the data. Here, publication of the
21Except for some algorithms developed by certain government agencies -
perhaps they have something to hide!
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algorithms can be done in the knowledge that many more maps
can be invented as required (subject to appropriate conditions
in terms of generating a fully chaotic field with a uniform PDF)
by a programmer, or possibly with appropriate ‘training’ of a
digital computer.
XII. CRYPSTICTM
Crypstic∗TM Limited22 is the trade mark for a USB based
product that currently uses three approaches for providing
secure mobile information exchange: (i) obfuscation; (ii) dis-
information; (iii) multi-algorithmic encryption using chaos.
The product is currently being marketed through Titon In-
ternational Limited (http://www.titoninternational.co.uk/). In
addition to performing basic encryption/decryption of data,
CrypsticTM is also used to covertly transfer digital images
or other plaintext that has been converted into a digital image
via the technique discussed in Section VII. In this case, the
noise field (see Figure 5) is the cipher output by CrypsticTM.
A. Obfuscation and Disinformation
Obfuscation is undertaken by embedding the application
(the .exe file that performs the encryption/decryption) in an
environment (i.e. the USB memory) that contains a wealth
of data (files and folders etc.) that is ideally designed to
reflect the users portfolio. This can includes areas that are
password protected and other public domain encryption sys-
tems with encrypted files, as required, that may be broken
and even generate apparently valuable information (given a
successful attack) but are, in fact, provided purely as a form
of disinformation. This environment is designed in order to
provide a potential attacker, who has gained access to a
users CrypsticTM through theft, for example, with a ‘target
rich’ environment. The rationale associated with the use of a
CrypsticTM as a mobile encryption/decryption device follows
that associated with a user’s management of a ‘key ring’. In
other words, it is assumed that the user will maintain and
implement the CrypsticTM in the same way as a conventional
set of keys are used. However, in the case of loss or theft, a new
CrypsticTM must be issued which includes a new encryption
engine and under no circumstances is the original CrypsticTM
re-issued. Management of the encryption engines and their
distribution is, of course, undertaken by CrypsticTM Limited
which maintains a data base of current users and the encryption
engines provided to them in compliance with the RIP Act,
2000, Section 49, which deals with the power of disclosure, i.e.
for CrypsticTM Limited to provide the appropriate encryption
engine for the decryption of any encrypted data that is under
investigation by an appropriate authority.
B. Encryption Engine Design
The encryption engine itself can be based on any number
of algorithms, each algorithm having been ‘designed’ with
respect to the required (maximum entropy) performance con-
ditions through implementation of the appropriate threshold
22Incorporated under the Companies Act 1985 for England and Wales as a
Private Company, Limited on 19th January, 2005, Company Number: 5337521
parameters T and ∆±. The design is based on applying the
following basic steps:
Step 1: Invent a (non-linear) function f and apply the IFS
xi+1 = f(xi, p1, p2, ...)
Step 2: Normalise the output of the IFS so that x∞ = 1.
Step 3: Graph the output xi and adjust parameters p1, p2, ...
until the output ‘looks’ chaotic.
Step 4: Graph the histogram of the output and observe if there
is a significant region of the histogram over which it is ‘flat’.
Step 5: Set the values of the thresholds T and ∆± based on
‘observations’ made in Step 4.
Analysing of the ISF using a Feigenbaum diagram can also be
undertaken but this can be computationally intensive. Further,
each ISF can be categorised in terms of parameters such as the
Lyapunov Dimension (Appendix II) and information entropy,
for example. However, in practice, such parameters yield little
in terms of the design of an IFS and are primarily ‘academic’.
Indeed, the invention and design of such algorithms has a
certain ‘art’ to it which improves with experience. It should
be noted that many such inventions fail to be of value in that
the statistics may not be suitable (e.g. the PDF may not be
flat enough or is flat only over a very limited portion of the
PDF), chaoticity may not be guaranteed for all values of the
seed x0 between 0 and 1 and the numerical performance of
the algorithm may be poor. The aim is to obtain a simple
IFS that is numerically relatively trivial to compute, has a
broad statistical distribution and is valid for all floating point
values of x0 between 0 and 1. Examples of the IFS used for
CrypsticTM are given in the following table where the values
of T , ∆+ and ∆− apply to the normalised output stream
generated by each function.
Function f(x) r T ∆+ ∆−
rx(1− tan(x/2)) 3.3725 0.5 0.3 0.3
rx[1− x(1 + x2)] 3.17 0.5 0.25 0.35
rx[1− x log(1 + x)] 2.816 0.6 0.3 0.2
r(1− | 2x− 1 |1.456) 0.9999 0.5 0.3 0.3
| sin(pirx1.09778) | 0.9990 0.6 0.25 0.25
The functions given in the table above produce outputs that
have a relatively broad and smooth histogram which can be
made flat by application of the values of T and ∆±. Some
functions, however, produce poor characteristic in this respect.
For example, the function
f(x) = r | 1− tan(sinx) |, r = 1.5
has a highly irregular histogram (see Figure 21) which is not
suitable in terms of applying values of T and ∆± and, as such,
is not an appropriate IFS for a CrypsticTM application.
C. Graphical User Interface
In conventional encryption systems, it is typical to provide
a Graphical User Interface (GUI) with fields for inputting
the plaintext and outputting the ciphertext where the name
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Fig. 21. The first 1000 elements for xi+1 = r | 1 − tan(sinxi) |, r =
1.5, 0 < x0 < 1 (above) and associated histogram (below).
of the output (including file extension) is supplied by the user.
CrypsticTM outputs the ciphertext by overwriting the input
file. This allows the file name, including the extension, to be
used to ‘seed’ the encryption engine and thus requires that the
name of the file remains unchanged in order to decrypt. The
seed is used to initiate the session key discussed in Section
XI(B). The file name is converted to an ASCII 7-bit decimal
integer stream which is then concatenated and the resulting
decimal integer used to seed a hash function whose output is
of the form (d, d, f, f, f) where d is a decimal integer and f
is a 32-bit precision floating point number between 0 and 1.
The executable file is camouflaged as a .dll file which is
embedded in a folder containing many such .dll files. The
reason for this is that the structure a .dll file is close to
that of a .exe file. Nevertheless, this requires that the source
code must be written in such a way that all references to
its application are void as discussed in Section II(E). This
includes all references to the nature of the data processing
involved including words such as Encrypt and Decrypt, for
example23, so that the compiled file, although camouflaged as a
.dll file, is forensically inert to attacks undertaken with systems
such a WinHEX [94]. In other words, the source code should
be written in a way that is ‘incomprehensible’, a condition
that is consistent with the skills of many software engineers!
This must include the development of a run time help facil-
ity. Clearly, such criteria are at odds with the ‘conventional
wisdom’ associated with the development of applications but
the purpose of this approach is to develop a forensically inert
executable file that is obfuscated by the environment in which
it is placed. An example of the GUI is given in Figure 22.
D. Procedure
The approach to loading the application to encrypt/decrypt a
file is based on renaming the .dll file to an .exe file with a given
name as well as the correct extension. Simply renaming a .dll
file in this way can lead to a possible breach of security by a
potential attacker using a key logging system [95]. In order to
avoid such an attack, CrypsticTM uses an approach in which
the name of the .dll file can be renamed to a .exe file by using
a ‘deletion dominant’ procedure. For example, suppose the
23Words that can be replaced by E and D respectively in a GUI.
Fig. 22. GUI of CrypsticTM encryption application.
application is called enigma.exe, then by generating a .dll file
called engine gmax index.dll, renaming can be accomplished
by deleting (in the order given) lld. followed by dni x followed
by en followed by g and then inserting a . between ae and
including e after ex. A further application is required such that
upon closing the application, the .exe file is renamed back to
its original .dll form. This includes ensuring that the time and
date stamps associated with the file are not updated.
The procedure described above is an attampt to obfus-
cate the use of passwords which are increasingly open to
attack [18] especially with regard to password protected USB
memory sticks. Many manufacturers break all the rules when
attempting to implement security. Checking the password and
unlocking the stick are two separate processes, both initiated
from the PC. Thus, from the point of view of the stick, they are
both separate processes, but this is a major flaw. The best sticks
handle all the encryption to and from the flash themselves and
do not keep a password at all. The fact that the data cannot be
decrypted without it makes it safe. The mediocre sticks store
a password inside the flash-controller and check it against a
password sent by the PC before unlocking the flash-memory.
This way, the password cannot be found by reading out the
flash-chip manually. The bad sticks do the same but store the
password on flash. Some sticks are even worse than this, they
store the password on flash and let the PC do the validation.
In addition to the procedures associated with password
validation, the concept of passwords protection is becoming
increasingly redundant. For example, Elcomsoft Limited re-
cently filed a US patent for a password cracking technique that
relies on the parallel processing capabilities of modern graph-
ics processors. The technique increases the speed of password
cracking by a factor of 25 using a GeForce 8800 Ultra graphics
card from Nvidia. ‘Cracking times can be reduced from days
or hours to minutes in some instances and there are plans
to introduce the technique into password cracking products’
(http://techreport.com/discussions.x/13460).
E. Protocol
CrypsticTM is a symmetric encryption system that relies on
the user working with a USB memory stick and maintaining
a protocol that is consistent with the use of a conventional
set of keys, typically located on a key ring. The simplest
use of CrysticTM is for a single user to be issued with a
CrypsticTM which incorporates an encryption engine that is
unique (through the utilisation of a unique set of algorithms
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which is registered with CrypsticTM Limited for a given user).
The user can then use the CrypsticTM to encrypt/decrypt files
and/or folders (after application of a compression algorithm
such as pkzip, for example) on a PC before closure of a
session. In this way, the user maintains a secure environment
using a unique encryption engine with a ‘key’ that includes a
covert access route, coupled with appropriate disinformation
as discussed in previous sections. Different encryption engines
can be incorporated that are used to encrypt disinformation in
order to provide a solution to the ‘gun to the head problem’
as required.
In the case of communications between ‘Alice and Bob’,
both users are issued with crypstics that have encryption
engines unique to Alice and Bob, each of whom can use the
facility for personal data security as above, and, in addition,
can encrypt files for email communications. If any crypstic, by
any party, is lost, then a new pair of crypstics are issued with
new encryption engines unique to both parties. In addition to
a two-party user system, crypstics can be issued to groups of
users in a way that provides an appropriate access hierarchy
as required.
F. Application of CrypsicTM for Data Protection
There are two specific applications of CrypsticTM. The
first is for transmitting encrypted information via the Internet
(as an email attachment) using non-standard ciphers and the
second is for encrypting information contained in a database
maintained on a PC, for example. Database encryption is
particularly important in light of the encreasing number of
breaches of security concerning sensitive personal information,
stored on databases held by organisations through loss/theft of
a PC, CD and other storage media. For example, on January
22, 2008, Tom Newton Dunn, the Defence Editor for The
Sun (UK) published the following: ‘A total of three MoD
laptops packed full of personal data are now missing, Defence
Secretary Des Browne admitted yesterday. He revealed that
two laptops had been stolen from blundering officers before a
third was taken in Birmingham earlier this month. And none
of the sensitive data was encrypted leaving British troops
under threat. Mr Brownes announcement to MPs followed
last weeks news that a laptop had been stolen from a junior
Navy officers car in Birmingham on January 9, 2008. The
Tories said an astonishing 347 MoD laptops had been stolen
in the past four years. And it emerged that the MoD ignored
key recommendations from a Government review to secure all
personal data after the scandal of lost child benefit details last
year. Last night Whitehall officials were banned from taking
laptops containing sensitive information out of their offices.
The two previous MoD thefts were in Edinburgh in 2005
and Manchester in 2006. The Manchester computer had the
same Navy and RAF database that was nicked in Birmingham
details of 600,000 potential recruits in the last ten years. Mr
Browne said it included passport, National Insurance, NHS and
driving licence numbers, and some banking details. Ordering
a full review, he said: ‘This must never happen again.’ The
officers in charge of the laptops may be prosecuted. Tory
defence chief Liam Fox slammed MoD ‘incompetence’.
Databases and the data they contain remain tempting targets
for hackers and internal users, who look to exploit the many
widespread weaknesses found in database-driven applications.
The following five database-related vulnerabilities are among
the most common: (i) password policies; (ii) SQL injection;
(iii) cross-site scripting; (iv) data leakage; (v) improper error
handling. In a study released in October 2006, the Ponemon
Institute [96] found that data breaches cost companies an
average of $182 per compromised record, a 31% increase
over 2005. Ponemon studied 31 companies that experienced
a data breach. The total costs for each loss ranged from less
than $1 million to more than $22 million, according to the
2006 findings. ‘The difference in security budgets between
companies that have been breached or not breached is big. A
company that hasn’t suffered a breach might have a budget of
$500,000 dollars. A company that has suffered a breach will
more likely have a budget of $5 million’.
1) Passwords: Passwords, even if properly implemented,
are a growing vulnerability as a result of keylogging. A
recent White Paper from McAfee states: ‘... there has been a
massive increase in the use of keyloggers, malicious programs
that track the user’s typing activity to capture passwords and
other private information. Between January 2004 and May
2006, keylogger use rose 250% . Meanwhile, the number
of fishing alerts tracked by the Anti-fishing Working Group
increased 100-fold during the same period.’ The paper also
added, ‘...identity theft is taking a high toll on economies
around the world’, and pointed to a Federal Trade Commission
assessment that the annual cost for consumers and businesses
in the United States alone is $ 50 billion a year. ‘In the United
Kingdom, the Home Office has calculated the cost of identity
theft to the British economy at $3.2 billion during the last
three years, and some estimates from the Australian Centre
for Policing Research place the cost of identity theft at $3
billion each year.’ According to Bill Gates, ‘Passwords are
the weak link’. ‘We need to move in the direction of smart
cards, and multi-factor authentication must be built into the
system itself. We need the ability to track what goes on and
have a built-in recovery system.’
2) Internal Theft: A fundamental principal concerning in-
ternal theft is that you cannot trust your own employees. A
recent survey of 1,000 workers by Tickbox.net showed 60%
admitted to stealing from their employers confidential docu-
ments, sales leads, customer databases and business contacts.
A recent Data Genetics International report said that of the
cases they had investigated around 70% of data breaches had
been internal. A new threat is Pod slurping. This is a method
that illegally uploads gigabytes of confidential information
from an organization’s computer systems to an iPod or any
other removable storage device. Those engaging in the practice
often utilize programs like slurp.exe, which make it easier to
search relevant directories on a computer system for typical
business documents in Word and Excel format. The slurp.exe
program is capable of copying 100 MB worth of data from the
Windows ‘Documents and Settings’ directory in a matter of
minutes. Once the information is slurped it can be downloaded,
analyzed and even sold.
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3) Hackers: Hacking is a continual threat. For example,
in December 2006, a hacker gained access to a computer
system at the University of California, Los Angeles. About
800,000 potential victims were notified. In August, AT&
T notified about 19,000 customers that their personal data
was compromised after digital miscreants hacked one of its
computer systems and gained access to credit card information
and other personal data. In late 2005, a timeshare unit of
Marriott International Inc. notified over 200,000 customers
that data on backup tapes were stolen. In January 2007, retailer
TJX Companies Inc., which runs several discount clothing and
home goods stores, said that its systems had been breached
by an attacker who may have stolen the credit card data of
millions of customers.
4) Principal Issues for Solutions Development: Some of
the principal issues associated with loss of sensitive data
are as follows: (i) Any live database cannot be encrypted
otherwise it cannot be queried. Therefore, the first step is
to ensure that both physical and electronic security for the
database is of the highest level. Any backup tapes must be very
securely encrypted. (ii) It is not sensible or acceptable, bearing
in mind the internal threats, simply to rely on Intranet or
Internet protocols to protect sensitive data. (iii) It is no longer
sensible to rely on passwords. (iv) Access to information based
on data is essential for a business to operate. However, the
risk of data loss seems to be even greater from within the
organisation than from external threats. Therefore, there is
no sense in securing the perimeter - the same strong access
controls need to be in place both internally and externally.
This has the added advantage of allowing authorised access
externally using the same methodology. The GCHQ project on
Information Assurance is moving away from the PKI approach
to identity assurance which does not rely on a relatively weak
asymmetric encryption system. There seems to be a need to
rethink the approach to solving this problem.
5) Database Security and Access: In light of the above, we
consider the following points with regard to the application of
CrypsticTM for database security and access: (i) A live data-
base needs to be both electronically and physically secure. (ii)
New data needs to be added in such a way that the originating
system deletes it after confirming it has been stored safely.
(iii) Backup tapes must be both strongly encrypted and safely
stored. (iv) Information gathered from the Database by Query
Engines must be carefully restricted and each query must leave
an audit trail and be capable of being monitored in real time.
(v) It must be impossible to ask a Query Engine to recreate
all or part of the database - only higher level information
analysis or appropriate parts of individual records should be
accessible. (vi) Non-password access is essential to defeat
keyloggers. CrypsticTM has developed two new approaches
to achieving this. The stronger is based on reconfiguring the
hardware within a USB Stick Device. (vii) To identify a user, a
biometric would be ideal. A fingerprint reader on a USB Stick
would be fine provided a hacker cannot simply emulate the
‘match OK’ signal. An alternative may be face recognition. For
example, Aladdin has a time-sensitive security system. Instead
of displaying a code, this could be internally used to create
time synchronised encryption. (viii) To defeat a sustained
attack on the encryption system, CrypsticTM provides multi-
algorithmic technology whereby every user or group of users
has a unique encryption engine. (ix) Loss or theft of the
USB Device must not automatically lead to a security breach.
However, a security recovery system should be implemented
to replace all group devices and internal encryption promptly.
XIII. DISCUSSION
The material discussed in this paper has covered some of
the basic principles associated with cryptography in general,
including the role of diffusion and confusion for designing
ciphers that have no statistical bias. This has been used as a
guide in the design of ciphers that are based on the application
of IFS exhibiting chaotic behaviour. The use of IFS allow for
the design of encryption engines that are multi-algorithmic,
each algorithm being based on an IFS that is invented, subject
to the condition that the output stream has a uniform PDF. The
principle of multi-algorithmicity has been used to develop a
new product - CrypsticTM - that is based on the following:
(i) a multi-algorithmic block encryption engine consisting of
a unique set of IFS; (ii) maximum entropy conversion to a bit
stream cipher; (iii) a key that is determined by the file name to
be encrypted/decrypted. The approach has passed all statistical
tests [11] recommended by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) [97].
Access and use of the encryption engine is based on
utilizing a commercial-off-the-shelf USB flash memory via
a combination of camouflage, obfuscation and disinformation
in order to elude any potential attacker. The approach has
been based on respecting the following issues: (i) security is a
process not a product; (ii) never underestimate the enemy; (iii)
the longer that any cryptosystem, or part thereof, remains of
the same type with the same function, the more vulnerable
the system becomes to a successful attack. Point (iii) is a
singularly important feature which CrypsticTM overcomes by
utilizing a dynamic approach to the design and distribution of
encryption engines.
A. Chaos Theory and Cryptography
There is a fundamental relationship between cryptography
and chaos. In both cases, the object of study is a dynamic
system that performs an iterative nonlinear transformation of
information in an apparently unpredictable but deterministic
manner [11]. In terms of sensitivity to initial conditions
together with the mixing properties of chaotic systems, with
appropriate entropy conscious post-processing (as discussed in
Section VIII), it is possible to ensure cryptographic confusion
and diffusion as discussed in Section V. However, there are a
number of conceptual differences between chaos theory and
cryptography: (i) chaos theory is often concerned with the
study of dynamical systems defined on an infinite state space
whereas cryptography relies on a finite-state machine and all
chaos models implemented on a computer are approximations,
i. e. digital computers can only generate pseudo-chaos; (ii)
chaos theory typically studies the asymptotic behaviour of
a nonlinear system (i.e. the behaviour of the system as the
number of iterations approach infinity when the Lyapunov
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dimension can be quantified - see Appendix II in which the
definition of the Lyapunov dimension is based on N → ∞),
whereas cryptography focuses on the effect of a small number
of iterations that are typically determined by the size of the
plaintext; (iii) chaos theory is not necessarily concerned with
the algorithmic complexity of an IFS but in the interpretation
of the IFS with regard to the physical model from which
it has been derived; in cryptography, complexity is the key
issue and thus, the concepts of cryptographic security and
efficiency have no counterparts in chaos theory; (iv) classical
chaotic systems usually have recognizable attractors whereas
in cryptography, we attempt to eliminate any structure by
post processing the output to produce a maximum entropy
cipher; (v) unlike chaos in general, cryptographic systems
use a combination of independent variables to provide an
output that is unpredictable to an observer; (vi) chaos theory is
often associated with the mathematical model used to quantify
a physically significant problem, whereas in cryptography,
the physical model is of no importance. The following table
provides a comparison between chaos theory and cryptography
in terms of those aspects of the two subjects that have been
considered in this paper [11].
Chaos Theory Cryptography
Chaotic system Pseudo-chaotic system
Nonlinear transform Nonlinear transform
Infinite number of states Finite states
Infinite number of iterations Finite iterations
Initial state Plaintext
Final state Ciphertext
Initial condition(s) key
and/or parameter(s)
Asymptotic independence of Confusion
initial and final states
Sensitivity to initial Diffusion
condition(s) and
parameter(s) mixing
Point (vi) above is of particular importance with regard
to the design of chaos based encryption engines. Whereas
previous publications in this field (e.g. [75], [76], [82], [83],
[93]) have considered variations on established IFS, in this
paper, we have considered the idea that, in principal, an
unlimited number of IFS can be ‘invented’ by a designer
in order to provide a limitless range of multi-algorithmic
encryption engines.
Chaotic systems are algorithmically random and thus, can-
not be predicted by a deterministic machine even with infinite
power [11], [92]. However, chaotic systems are predictable
by a probabilistic machine and thus, finding probabilistically
unpredictable chaotic systems is a central problem for chaos
based cryptography. In this paper, the generation of an unpre-
dictable cipher has been undertaken by filtering those numbers
that belong to a uniform partition of the PDF in order to
generate a maximum entropy cipher. This approach comes
at the expense of numerical performance since a relatively
large percentage (upto 50% is some cases) of the floating point
numbers that are computed are consequently discarded by the
filter.
Chaos theory is not related to number theory in the same
way as conventional cryptographic algorithms are, nor is
chaos theory related to the computational complexity analysis
that underpins digital cryptography. Hence, neither chaos, nor
pseudo-chaos can guarantee pseudo-randomness and resistance
to different kinds of cryptanalysis based on conventional sce-
narios. The use of floating-point arithmetic is the most obvious
solution for approximating continuous chaos on a finite-state
machine. However, there is no straightforward application
to pseudo-random number generation and cipher generation.
Critical problems can include: (i) growing rounding-off errors;
(ii) structural instability, i.e. different initial conditions and
parameters giving different cryptographic properties, such as
very short cycles, weak plaintexts or weak keys.
Chaotic systems based on smooth nonlinear functions (e.g.
x2, sin(x), tan(x) and log(x)) produce sequences with a
highly non-uniform distribution and can therefore be predicted
by a probabilistic machine. By applying a partitioning strategy
to generate a uniform output, a bit stream cipher with uniform
statistical properties can be obtained which passes all pseudo-
randomness tests. Some piecewise-linear maps generate se-
quences, which have theoretically flat distributions. However,
in practice, these maps are less suitable than nonlinear maps
because of the overall effect of linearity, rounding and it-
erative transformations and may be characterised by highly
non-uniform statistics. The need to post-process the outputs
form chaotic iterators, in order to provide bit-streams with
no statistical bias, leads to a cryptosystem that is relatively
inefficient when compared to conventional PRNGs. Further,
the lack of any fundamental theoretical framework with regard
to the pseudo-random properties of IFS leads to a basic
incompatibility with modern cryptography. However, this is
off-set by the flexibility associated with the use of multi-
algorithmicity for generating numerous and, theoretically, an
unlimited number of unique encryption engines.
All conventional cryptographic systems (encryption
schemes, pseudo-random generators, hash functions) can be
considered to be binary pseudo-chaotic systems, based on bit
stream encryption defined over a finite space. Such systems
are periodic and have a limited sensitivity to the initial
conditions, i.e. the Lyapunov exponents are positive only if
measured at the beginning of the process (before one can see
the cycles). Different IFS will have different cycle lengths.
Measuring the minimum, maximum and average length of an
IFS is not a trivial problem, but clearly, ideal cryptographic
systems have a single cycle that includes all the possible
states. In practice, the cycle length of a IFS must be less
than the length of the plaintext for which it is used. In this
sense, it is arguable that the use of multi-algorithmicity is a
necessary as well as a desirable design feature.
Iterative block ciphers can be viewed in terms of a combina-
tion of two linked pseudo-chaotic systems, data and round-key
systems. The IFS of such systems includes nonlinear substi-
tutions, row shifts, column mixing and so on. The round-key
system is a pseudo-random generator providing a sensitivity
dependence of the ciphertext on the key. Technically, most
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pseudo-random generators are based on the stretch-and-fold
transformation: first, the state is stretched over a large space
(e.g. through multiplication and/or through application of a
power), then folded into the original state space (using a
periodic function, for example). This stretch-and-fold trans-
formation forms the basis of the majority of IFS used in
cryptography.
In the design of any chaos based cryptosystem, it is
important to have a structurally stable cryptosystem, i.e. a
system that has (almost) the same cycle length and Lyapunov
exponents for all initial conditions and a given control para-
meter set. Many pseudo-chaotic systems do not possess this
quality. Approximations to chaos are usually based on fixed
precision computations. However, it is possible to increase
the precision or resolution (e.g. the length of a binary state
string) in each iteration, a precision that can, according to a
set of rules, be used to estimate the impact of an error. One-
way transformations form the basis of most PRNGs, whereas
a key-dependent invertible transformation is the essence of
a cipher or encryption scheme. Most chaos based ciphers
can be extended to include invertible transformations such
as XOR, cyclic shifts and other permutations and the latter
transformations can also be considered as pseudo-chaotic
maps. Further, asymmetric cryptographic systems are based on
trapdoor functions, i.e. functions that have a one-way property
unless a secret parameter (trapdoor) is known. No counterpart
of a trapdoor transformation is known in chaos theory and
thus, it is not currently possible to produce an equivalent to
the RSA algorithm, for example, using an IFS. However, it is
noted that asymmetric encryption algorithms such as the RSA
algorithm can be used to transfer a database of algorithms
used for the multi-algorithmic symmetric encryption schemes
considered in this paper.
B. Covertext and Stegotext
One of the principal weaknesses of all encryption systems is
that the form of the output data (the ciphertext), if intercepted,
alerts the intruder to the fact that the information being
transmitted may have some importance and that it is therefore
worth attacking and attempting to decrypt it. In Figure 1,
for example, if a postal worker observed some sophisticated
‘strong box’ with an impressive lock passing through the post
office, it would be natural for them to wonder what might be
inside. It would also be natural to assume that the contents of
the box would have a value in proportion with the strength
of the box/lock. These aspects of ciphertext transmission can
be used to propagate disinformation, achieved by encrypting
information that is specifically designed to be intercepted and
decrypted. In this case, we assume that the intercept will be
attacked, decrypted and the information retrieved. The key to
this approach is to make sure that the ciphertext is relatively
strong (but not too strong!) and that the information extracted
is of high quality in terms of providing the attacker with
‘intelligence’ that is perceived to be valuable and compatible
with their expectations, i.e. information that reflects the con-
cerns/interests of the individual(s) and/or organisation(s) that
encrypted the data. This approach provides the interceptor with
a ‘honey pot’ designed to maximize their confidence especially
when they have had to put a significant amount of work in to
‘extracting it’. The trick is to make sure that this process is
not too hard or too easy. ‘Too hard’ will defeat the object of
the exercise as the attacker might give up; ‘too easy’, and the
attacker will suspect a set-up!
In addition to providing an attacker with a honey-pot for
the dissemination of disinformation, it is of significant value
if a method can be found that allows the real information to
be transmitted by embedding it in non-sensitive information
after (or otherwise) it has been encrypted, e.g. camouflaging
the ciphertext using methods of Steganography. This provides
a significant advantage over cryptography alone in that en-
crypted messages do not attract attention to themselves. No
matter how well plaintext is encrypted (i.e. how unbreakable
it is), by default, a ciphertext will arouse suspicion and may
in itself be incriminating, as in some countries encryption is
illegal. With reference to Figure 1, Steganography is equivalent
to transforming the ‘strong box’ into some other object that
will pass through without being noticed - a ‘chocolate-box’,
for example.
The word ‘Steganography’ is of Greek origin and means
‘covered’, or ‘hidden writing’. In general, a steganographic
message appears as something else or Covertext. The conver-
sion of a ciphertext to another plaintext form is called Ste-
gotext conversion and is based on the use of covertext. Some
covertext must first be invented and the ciphertext embedded
or mapped on to it in some way to produce the stegotext. The
basic principle is given in the following schematic diagram:
Data → Covertext
↓
Plaintext → Ciphertext → Stegotext
↓
Transmission
Note that this approach does not necessarily require the use
of plaintext to ciphertext conversion as illustrated above and
that plaintext can be converted into stegotext directly. For
example, a simple approach to this is to use a mask to delete
all characters in a message except those that are to be read by
the recipient of the message. Apart from establishing a method
of exchanging the mask, which is equivalent to the key in
cryptography, the principal problem with this approach is that
different messages have to be continuously ‘invented’ in order
to accommodate hidden messages and that these ‘inventions’
must appear to be legitimate. However, the wealth of data
that is generated and transmitted in todays environment, and
the wide variety of formats that are used, means that there is
much greater potential for exploiting steganographic methods
than were previously available. In other words, the wealth of
information now available has generated a camouflage rich
environment in which to operate and one can attempt to
hide plaintext or ciphertext (or both) in a host of data types,
including audio and video files and digital images. More-
over, by understanding the characteristics of a transmission
environment, it is possible to conceive techniques in which
information can be embedded in the transmission noise, i.e.
where natural transmission noise is the covertext. There are,
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of course, a range of counter measures - Steganalysis - that
can be implemented in order to detect stegotext. However, the
techniques usually require access to the covertext which is then
compared with the stegotext to see if any modifications have
been introduced. The problem is to find ways of obtaining the
original stegotext which is equivalent to a plaintext attack.
C. Hiding Data in Images
The relatively large amount of data contained in digital
images makes them a good medium for undertaking steganog-
raphy. Consequently digital images can be used to hide
messages in other images. A colour image typically has 8
bits to represent the red, green and blue components. Each
colour component is composed of 256 colour values and the
modification of some of these values in order to hide other
data is undetectable by the human eye. This modification is
often undertaken by changing the least significant bit in the
binary representation of a colour or grey level value (for grey
level digital images). For example, the grey level value 128
has the binary representation 10000000. If we change the least
significant bit to give 10000001 (which corresponds to a grey
level value of 129) then the difference in the output image,
in terms of a single pixel, will not be discernable. Hence,
the least significant bit can be used to encode information
through modification of pixel intensity. Further, if this is done
for each colour component, then a letter of ASCII text can be
represented for every three pixels. The larger the host image
compared with the hidden ‘image’, the more difficult it is to
detect the message. Further, it is possible to hide an image
in another image for which there are a number of approaches
available.
CrypsticTM explicitly uses the method discussed in Section
VII on Stochastic Diffusion for steganographic applications.
The plaintext (which, in the case of written material, is limited
in this application to an image of a single text page) is first
converted into an image file which is then diffused with a noise
field that is generated by CrypsticTM. The host image (which
is embedded in an environment of different digital images) is
distributed with each CrypsticTM depending on the protocol
and user network associated with its application. Note that the
host image represents, quite literally, the key to recovering the
hidden image. The additive process applied is equivalent to the
process of confusion that is the basis for a substitution cipher.
Rather than the key being used to generate a random number
stream using a pre-defined algorithm from which the stream
can be re-generated (for the same key), the digital image is, in
effect, being used as the cipher. By diffusing the image with
a noise field, it is possible to hide the output in a host image
without having to resort to quantization. In the case of large
plaintext documents, each page is converted into an image file
and the image stream embedded in a host video.
D. Hiding Data in Noise
The ‘art’ of steganography is to use what ever covertext is
readily available to make the detection of plaintext or, ideally,
the ciphertext as difficult as possible. This means that the
embedding method used to introduce the plaintext/ciphertext
into the covertext should produce a stegotext that is indis-
tinguishable from the covertext in terms of its statistical
characteristics and/or the information it conveys. From an
information theoretic point of view, the covertext should have
significantly more capacity than the cipheretext, i.e. there must
be a high level of redundancy. Utilising noisy environments
often provides an effective solution to this problem. There are
three approaches that can be considered: (i) embedding the
ciphertext in real noise; (ii) transforming the ciphertext into
noise that is then added to data; (iii) replacing real noise with
ciphertext that has been transformed in to synthetic noise with
exactly the same properties as the real noise.
In the first case, we can make use of noise sources such
as thermal noise, flicker noise, and shot noise associated with
electronics that digitize an analogue signal. In digital imaging
this may be noise from the imaging Charge Couple Device
(CCD) element; for digital audio, it may be noise associated
with the recording techniques used or amplification equipment.
Natural noise generated in electronic equipment usually pro-
vides enough variation in the captured digital information so
that it can be exploited as a noise source to ‘cover’ hidden data.
Because such noise is usually a linear combination of different
noise types generated by different physical mechanisms, it is
usually characterised by a normal or Gaussian distribution as
a result of the Central Limit Theorem (see Appendix I).
In the second case, the ciphertext is transformed into noise
whose properties are consistent with the noise that is to be
expected in certain data fields. For example, lossy compression
schemes (such as JPEG - Joint Photographic Expert Group)
always introduce some error (numerical error) into the de-
compressed data and this can be exploited for steganographic
purposes. By taking a clean image and adding ciphertext noise
to it, information can be transmitted covertly providing all
users of the image assume that it is the output of a JPEG or
some other lossy compressor. Of course, if such an image is
JPEG compressed, then the covert information may be badly
corrupted.
In the third case, we are required to analyse real noise and
derive an algorithm for its synthesis. Here, the noise has to
be carefully synthesized because it may be readily observable
as it represents the data stream in its entirety rather than
data that is ‘cloaked’ in natural noise. This technique also
requires that the reconstruction/decryption method is robust in
the presence of real noise which we should assume will be
added to the synthesized noise during a transmission phase.
In this case, random fractal models are of value because
the spectral properties of many noise types found in nature
signify fractal properties to a good approximation [53], [69].
This includes transmission noise over a range of radio and
microwave spectra, for example, and Internet traffic noise
[33]. With regard to Internet traffic noise, the time series data
representing packet size and inter-arrival times shows well
defined random fractal properties with a fractal dimension that
varies over a 24 hour cycle. This can be used to submit emails
by fracturing files into byte sizes that characterise packet
size and submitting each fractured file at time intervals that
characterise the inter-arrival times at the point of submission
[98], [99]. In both cases, the principal ‘characteristic’ is the
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fractal dimension computed from live Internet data.
E. Review of Encryption and Steganographic Models
The basic models considered in this paper relate to the
seperate processes of encryption and steganography. For
the symmetric encryption method considered, the encryption
process is undertaken using the conventional result (given one-
dimensional bit streams)
ciphertext = cipher ⊕ plaintext.
For the steganographic and image watermarking methods
considered, the model is (given two-dimensional floating point
arrays)
stegotext = cipher ⊗ plaintext+ covertext
for electronic-to-electronic steganography and
ciphertext = cipher ⊗ plaintext
for electronic-to-hardcopy steganography. In each case, the ci-
pher can be generated through application of multi-algorithmic
IFS as used in the product CrypsticTM, for example, reported
in Section XII.
APPENDIX I
CENTRAL LIMIT THEOREM FOR A UNIFORM
DISTRIBUTION
We study the effect of applying multiple convolutions of the
uniform distribution
P (x) =
{
1
X , | x |≤ X/2;
0, otherwise
and show that
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pi(x) ≡ P1(x)⊗ P2(x)⊗ ...⊗ PN (t)
'
√
6
piN
exp(−6x2/XN)
where Pi(x) = P (x), ∀n and N is large. by considering
the effect of multiple convolutions in Fourier space (through
application of the convolution theorem) and then working with
a series representation of the result.
The Fourier transform of P (x) is given by
P˜ (k) =
∞∫
−∞
P (x) exp(−ikx)dx
=
X/2∫
−X/2
1
X
exp(−ikx)dx = sinc(kX/2)
where sinc(x) = sin(x)/x - the ‘sinc’ function. Thus,
P (x)⇐⇒ sinc(kX/2)
where ⇐⇒ denotes transformation into Fourier space, and
from the convolution theorem in follows that
Q(x) =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pi(x)⇐⇒ sincN(kX/2).
Using the series expansion of the sin function for an arbitrary
constant α,
sinc(αk) =
1
αk
(
αk− 1
3!
(αk)3 +
1
5!
(αk)5 − 1
7!
(αk)7 + . . .
)
= 1− 1
3!
(αk)2 +
1
5!
(αk)4 − 1
7!
(αk)6 + . . .
The N th power of sinc(αk) can be written in terms of a
binomial expansion giving
sincN(αk) =
(
1− 1
3!
(αk)2 +
1
5!
(αk)4 − 1
7!
(αk)6 + . . .
)N
= 1−N
(
1
3!
(αk)2 − 1
5!
(αk)4 +
1
7!
(αk)6 − . . .
)
+
N(N − 1)
2!
(
1
3!
(αk)2 − 1
5!
(αk)4 +
1
7!
(αk)6 − . . .
)2
−N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!
(
(αk)2
3!
− (αk)
4
5!
+
(αk)6
7!
− . . .
)3
+ . . .
= 1−N α
2k2
3!
+N
α4k4
5!
− kα
6k6
7!
− . . .+ N(N − 1)
2!
(
α4k4
(3!)2
− 2α
6k6
3!5!
+ . . .
)
−N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!
(
α6k6
(3!)3
+ . . .
)
+ ...
= 1− N
3!
α2k2 +
(
N
5!
α4 +
N(N − 1)
2!(3!)2
α4
)
k4
−
(
N
7!
α6 +
N(N − 1)
3!5!
α6 +
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
3!(3!)3
α6
)
k6+ . . .
Now the series representation of the exponential (for an
arbitrary positive constant c) is
exp(−ck2) = 1− ck2 + 1
2!
c2k4 − 1
3!
c3k6 + . . .
Equating terms involving k2, k4 and k6 it is clear that
(evaluating the factorials),
c =
1
6
Nα2,
1
2
c2 =
(
1
120
N +
1
72
N(N − 1)
)
α4
or
c2 =
(
1
36
N2 − 1
90
N
)
α4,
and
1
6
c3 =
(
N
5040
+
N(N − 1)
720
+
N(N − 1)(N − 2)
1296
)
α6
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or
c3 =
(
1
216
N3 − 1
1080
N2 +
1
2835
N
)
α6.
Thus, by deduction, we can conclude that
cn =
(
1
6
N
)n
α2n +O(Nn−1α2n).
Now, for large N , the first term in the equation above
dominates to give the following approximation for the constant
c,
c ' 1
6
Nα2.
We have therefore shown that the N th power of the sinc(αk)
function approximates to a Gaussian function (for large N ),
i.e.
sincN(αk) ' exp
(
−1
6
Nα2k2
)
.
Thus, if α = X2 , then
Q(x)⇐⇒ exp
(
−X
24
Nk2
)
approximately. The final part of the proof is therefore to
Fourier invert the function exp(−XNk2/24), i.e. to compute
the integral
I =
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
(
− 1
24
XNk2
)
exp(ikx)dk
=
1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp
−
(√XN
24
k −
√
24
XN
ix
2
)2
+
6x2
XN
 dk
=
1
pi
√
6
XN
e−
6x2
XN
∞+ix
√
6
XN∫
−∞+ix
√
6
XN
e−y
2
dy
after making the substitution
y =
√
XN
6
k
2
− ix
√
6
XN
.
By Cauchy’s theorem
I =
1
pi
√
6
XN
e−
6x2
XN
∞∫
−∞
e−z
2
dz =
√
6
piXN
e−
6x2
XN
where we have use the result
∞∫
−∞
exp(−y2)dy = √pi.
Thus, we can write
Q(x) =
N∏
i=1
⊗ Pi(x) '
√
6
piXN
exp[−6x2/(XN)]
for large N .
APPENDIX II
THE LYAPUNOV DIMENSION
A principal and distinctive characteristic of a chaotic system
is bifurcation and a common measure of this characteristic
is the Lyapunov exponent. For iterative processes in general,
where stable convergent behaviour is expected, an output that
is characterised by exponential growth can be taken to be due
to unacceptable numerical instability. However, with IFS that
exhibit intrinsic instability leading to bifurcation and chaos
where the output does not converge to a specific value, the
Lyapunov exponent is used to quantify the characteristics of
the output. This exponent or ‘Dimension’ provides a measure
of ‘chaoticity’ and thus, how long before a ‘forecast’ becomes
redundant.
Consider an iterative system defined by some (typically non-
linear) function f of the form
xn+1 = f(xn) = x+ n
where n is a perturbation to the value of x at an iterate
n which is independent of the value of x0. If the system
converges to f as n → ∞ then n → 0 as n → ∞ and
the system is stable. If this is not the case, then the system
may be divergent or chaotic. Suppose we model n in terms
of an exponential growth (λ > 0) or decay (λ < 0) so that
n+1 = c exp(nλ)
where c is an arbitrary constant. Then 1 = c, 2 = 1 exp(λ),
3 = 1 exp(2λ) = 2 exp(λ) and thus, in general, we can
write
n+1 = n exp(λ).
Noting that
ln
(
n+1
n
)
= λ
we can write
N∑
n=1
ln
(
n+1
n
)
= Nλ.
Thus, we can define λ as
λ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
ln
(
n+1
n
)
.
The constant λ is known as the Lyapunov exponent. Since we
can write
λ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(ln n+1 − ln n)
and noting that (using forward differencing)
d
dx
ln n ' ln n+1 − ln n
δx
= ln n+1 − ln n, δx = 1
we see that λ is, in effect, given by the mean value of the
derivatives of the natural logarithm of n, i.e.
λ = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
(
d
dx
ln n
)
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Note that, if the value of λ is negative, then the iteration
is stable and will approach f since we can expect that as
N → ∞, n+1/n < 1 and, thus, ln(n+1/n) < 0. If λ
is positive, then the iteration will not converge to x but will
diverge or, depending on the characteristics of the function
f , may exhibit bifurcation leading to chaotic behaviour. Since
f(xn) = x+ n, whose behaviour is dependent on the initial
condition x0, we can consider the following definition of the
Lyapunov exponent as a function of the initial condition:
λ(x0) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
ln |f ′(xn)| = lim
N→∞
1
N
log
N∏
n=1
|f ′(xn)|
where f ′ denotes the derivative of f . In this form, we see that
for each n, f ′(xn) expresses how much the function f changes
with respect to its argument at the point xn. The derivative
expresses the magnitude of change in transition from xk to
xk+1. The limit is the average of the derivative logarithms
over n iterations and provides a measure of how fast the IFS
changes as a function of n. A positive Lyapunov exponent is
therefore an indication of chaotic behavior and its magnitude,
a measure of the extent of ‘chaoticity’. For example, for the
Logistic map
f(x) = 4rx(1− x), x ∈ X = (0, 1), x0 ∈ X, r ∈ (0, 1)
the Lyapunov exponent is given by
λ(x0) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
log | r(1− 2xn) |
and for r = 0.9 and N = 4000,
λ(0.5) ≈ 0.7095
In the application of chaos to cryptography, the Lyapunov
exponent can be used to evaluate the sensitivity to initial
conditions. For example, larger values of λ indicate that we
need less encryption rounds in order to generate a cipher. Since
the Lyapunov exponent is a characterization of the ‘chaoticity’
of the signal f(xn), if we compute λN using N elements of
the signal fn [i.e. N elements of the output from the ISF
xn+1 = f(xn)] and then compute λM using M elements of
the same signal, we can define the Lyapunov dimension as
DL =
{
1− λNλM , λM > λN ;
1− λMλN , λM < λN .
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